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FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE IN AN AGE OF
DNA PROFILING*
Jennifer L. Mnookint
INTRODUCTION
In 1894, Mark Twain published the novella Pudd'nhead
Wilson.! The book tells the story of two baby boys of the same
age born in a small Missouri town in 1830, one the son of
respected parents, and the other, though only 1/ 3 2nd black, born
a slave.2 When the two boys were just a few months old, the
slave boy's mother, terrified by the thought that her newborn
son could someday be sold "down the river" into terrible
conditions, swapped the one child for the other, their race and
their identities exchanged in a single instant.' The white boy's
mother had died shortly after giving birth, and no one, not
even his father, noticed the switch. From that day on, the slave
woman's baby was raised as a white child, the nephew of the
town's most prominent resident, while the other boy was
brought up as her son and as a slave. The book also tells the
story of a man who moved to the town to try to be a lawyer, but
who got off on the wrong foot; he was instantly declared by the
townsfolk to be an empty-headed fool and was known
henceforth as Pudd'nhead Wilson.4
*©2001 Jennifer L. Mnookin. All Rights Reserved.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I am
grateful to Simon Cole, Neal Feigenson, and participants in the Brooklyn Law School
Symposium, DNA- Lessons From the Past-Problems for the Future, for helpful
comments. Thanks to Betsy Scott and Stuart Shapley for helpful research assistance.
1 MARK TWAIN, THE TRAGEDY OF PUDDNHEAD WILSON (7th ed. 1964) (1894).
2 Id. at 29.
'Id. at 36-37.41d. at 26.
BROOKLYN LA WREVIEW
Over time, Pudd'nhead came to be viewed as a likeable
oddball, a man with eccentric and eclectic hobbies. One of these
hobbies, what Twain calls "a fad without a name," involved
asking people to leave the marks of their fingers on narrow
glass strips that Pudd'nhead would carefully label, file, and
pore over.5 Everyone in town had been subjected, often multiple
times, to Pudd'nhead Wilson's fascination with fingermarks,
and they indulged his strange obsessions with bemusement
and affection. They viewed it, as Twain writes, as "old time
childish 'puttering' and folly."'
This odd pastime of Pudd'nhead's turned out to provide
the key to solving a murder and preventing the wrongful
conviction of two innocent men. The town's most prominent
citizen was stabbed to death.7 All the circumstantial evidence
pointed to two strangers in town, a certain man and his twin
brother, as the vicious culprits.8 Pudd'nhead, representing the
twins in his first-ever legal assignment, revealed the true
murderer, thanks to the smudgy whorls and lines left by a
bloody hand on the weapon used to commit the crime. He told
everyone in the courtroom about how fingerprints provided the
ultimate signature, a "physiological autograph" that could not
be "counterfeited," disguised or changed over time, a signature
that had "no duplicate ... among the swarming populations of
the globe."9
Through an in-court demonstration in which
Pudd'nhead proved that he could identify people just by seeing
the marks left by their fingers, the lawyer showed that he was
no Pudd'nhead after all. And he showed the rapt audience who
had really left those bloody marks on the knife: not the two
strangers, but the murdered man's own supposed nephew."
Even more shocking, Pudd'nhead used his extensive
fingerprint records to show the astonished townspeople that
the murdered man's nephew wasn't actually his nephew at all,
Id. at 27-28.
TWAIN, supra note 1, at 158.7 Id. at 141.
8 Id. at 148.
9 Id. at 158-59.
10 Id. at 164.
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but rather, the son of a slave boy whose identity had been
switched with the nephew's at the tender age of eight months."
Thus Pudd'nhead's eccentric obsession with fingerprints
not only determined the real murderer's identity but also
brought to light the cradle switching of so many years earlier.
In Twain's novella, fingerprints were the key to the truth; once
they were revealed, all doubts disappeared. While the truth
revealed by the fingerprints shocked everyone, the prints spoke
with an authority that no one questioned. When the novella
was published in 1894, fingerprinting was only used to solve
fictional crimes; it had not yet been used by the police in the
United States to create an identification system for criminals,
nor was it used as evidence in courts of law. 2 And yet, in the
novel, fingerprints already operated as an extraordinarily
stable marker of identity, more fixed and permanent than
status, name, or even race. Fingerprints could reveal peoples'
true identity, even if they did not know it themselves. Fifteen
years later, when fingerprints made their way into the
American courtroom as evidence, they quickly came to be seen
as an enormously powerful kind of proof, often deemed as
certain and as persuasive as they seemed in Twain's novella.
This Article will examine the history of fingerprint
evidence as well as contemporary challenges to this important
form of legal proof. The overall story this Article will tell is that
scrutiny of expert evidence does not take place in a cultural
vacuum. What seems obvious, what needs to be proven, what
can be taken for granted, and what is viewed as problematic all
depend on cultural assumptions and shared beliefs, and these
can change over time in noticeable and dramatic ways.
Whatever the ostensible legal standard used, it is filtered
through these shared beliefs and common practices. When
, TWAIN, supra note 1, at 163-64.
12 Fingerprinting began to be used by the police for criminal identification in
the first decade of the twentieth century, though it was used earlier in India. See
SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION (2001) (providing an excellent recent cultural history focusing on the
emergence of fingerprinting as a system of criminal identification). Throughout this
Article, I build and draw upon Cole's work, though I focus more exclusively on the
courtroom setting and more explicitly on the legal admissibility of the new technique.
See also COLIN BEAVAN, FINGERPRINTS: THE ORIGINS OF CRIME DETECTION AND THE
MURDER CASE THAT LAUNCHED FORENSIC SCIENCE (2001) (discussing the history of
fingerprinting).
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forms of evidence comport with broader understandings of
what is plausible, they may be especially likely to escape
careful scrutiny as legal evidence, no matter what the formal
legal standard used to evaluate them looks like. While
commentators have often criticized the legal system for being
too conservative in admitting expert evidence, the problem may
be quite the reverse: we may need to be more worried about
quick and widespread acceptance of a new technique leading to
its deep and permanent entrenchment.
Moreover, this Article will suggest that the often-
disparaged "battles of the experts" can have a useful and
productive aspect. Although competing, contradictory experts
may create substantial practical difficulties for a lay jury that
lacks the expertise to choose between the experts' different
claims, these same battles may bring to light limitations in
research and problematic assumptions that otherwise would
escape the notice of experts and judges alike. Those who have
advocated "neutral experts" as a solution to the difficulties of
expert evidence in a lay jury system should therefore take heed
from the history of fingerprinting.
The first and second Parts of this Article will survey the
early history of fingerprinting evidence, showing how rapidly
fingerprinting was accepted by courts and what limited
scrutiny it received. Then, the third Part will briefly turn to a
more recent form of forensic identification, DNA profiling, to
show how there are certain surprising similarities between the
legal reception of fingerprinting at the beginning of the
twentieth century and the early reception of DNA
identification techniques. Finally, the fourth Part will show
how challenges to DNA profiling, in conjunction with doctrinal
shifts in the standards governing the admissibility of expert
evidence, have now opened the door to new challenges to
fingerprinting evidence, threatening to destabilize a form of
proof that has long been considered one of the most
authoritative forms of evidence.
I. THE EARLY RECEPTION OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE
Twain's representation of forensic fingerprint
identification foreshadowed, in certain important respects,
[Vol. 67: 1
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aspects of how fingerprint evidence was actually used in real
American courtrooms, a practice which began fifteen years
after Twain's novella was published. In fact, there are four
significant similarities between the fictional portrayal of
fingerprint evidence in Twain, and its genuine use in the
second and third decade of the twentieth century. This Section
will provide an overview of the history of fingerprinting by
exploring each similarity in turn.
A. Rapid Acceptance with Minimal Scrutiny
First, in real courtrooms just as in the novella,
fingerprints were accepted as an evidentiary tool without a
great deal of scrutiny or skepticism. In Pudd'nhead Wilson, the
attorney simply asserted the individuality of fingerprints. 3 The
public gathered in the courtroom and the jury, with
Pudd'nhead's guidance, looked at the lines and swirls of their
own prints and those of their neighbors. But Pudd'nhead
offered no systematic proof that fingerprints truly differed from
person to person, nor did he explain to what degree
fingerprints differed from one another. Similarly, in the
earliest cases in which fingerprint evidence was used in court,
there was no careful proof that a fingerprint could uniquely
identify a person, that fingerprints were both distinctive and
distinguishable. This critical premise was typically asserted
rather than established.
Let us look, for example, at the first case in the United
States in which fingerprints were introduced in evidence, the
1910 trial of Thomas Jennings for the murder of Clarence
Hiller. 4 There was some circumstantial evidence linking
Jennings to the crime. He was found by the police a few hours
after the murder with a freshly fired revolver containing
cartridges that matched those found near the dead body.
Moreover, he was identified by eyewitnesses as the intruder in
13 TWAIN, supra note 1, at 159 ("Taken finger for finger, your patterns differ
from your neighbor's ... One twin's patterns are never the same as his fellow twin's
patterns.").
14 The case was tried in 1910, and was appealed partly on the basis of the
admission of the fingerprint evidence. People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911). The
conviction was upheld and Jennings was executed on February 16, 1912.
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several other home break-ins in the neighborhood that same
evening. These were certainly suspicious circumstances, but
probably not sufficient for a conviction, and the Hiller family
could not definitely identify Jennings.15 However, the Hiller
family had just finished painting their house, and on the
railing of their back porch, four fingers of a left hand had been
imprinted in the still-wet paint.16 The prosecution wanted to
introduce expert testimony concluding that these fingerprints
belonged to none other than Thomas Jennings.
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution that they
had, in the course of their work with various Bureaus of
Identification, looked at thousands of fingerprints, and all
concluded that the fingerprints on the rail were made by the
defendant's hand. The judge allowed their testimony, and
Jennings was convicted. The defendant argued on appeal that
the prints were improperly admitted, but this argument was
unsuccessful. Citing such authorities as the Encyclopedia
Britannica and a treatise on handwriting identification, the
court emphasized that "standard authorities on scientific
subjects discuss the use of finger prints as a system of
identification, concluding that experience has shown it to be
reliable." 7 On the basis of these sources and the witnesses'
testimony, the court was prepared to conclude "that there is a
scientific basis for the system of finger print identification ...
[and] that this method of identification is in such general and
common use that the courts cannot refuse to take judicial
cognizance of it."'8
What was striking in Jennings, as well as the cases that
followed it, is that courts largely failed to ask the difficult
questions of the new identification technique. Just how
confident could fingerprint identification experts be that no two
fingerprints were really alike? The witnesses in Jennings
claimed to have personally looked at several thousand
fingerprints-but even if the several thousand were all
different, that hardly proved that all fingerprints are different.
15 Id. at 1078-80.
"Id. at 1080.
'Id.
1d. at 1082.
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Moreover, when evaluating prints in the context of
criminal identification, examiners had access to full sets of ten
complete prints; in the forensic context, by contrast, they
typically had fewer, often only one (though in the Jennings
case, four prints were available). Even if no two people had
identical sets of fingerprints, this did not establish that no two
people could have a single identical print, much less an
identical part of a print. These are necessarily matters of
probability, but neither the court in Jennings nor subsequent
judges ever required that fingerprinting identification be
placed on a secure statistical foundation. How many
similarities, how many points of resemblance, between two
prints were necessary in order to declare a match? Although
loose norms developed on this question, no definitive answer
was ever developed by American fingerprint examiners, nor did
judges require a minimum number of points of resemblance in
order for fingerprints to be admissible evidence. Determining
whether there was a match was simply left to the judgment of
the expert examiner. What were the chances that two partial,
fingerprints might in fact match, and yet come from different
people? To this day, fingerprint examiners have never been
required to give an answer to this question, and to this day,
they remain incapable of providing an answer that is rooted in
a persuasive statistical model of fingerprint variation.
In addition, in any system of human evaluation, there is
the possibility of error: what were the chances that a
fingerprint examiner might erroneously declare a match (a
false positive) or erroneously think that two prints did not
match when they actually did (a false negative)? Neither the
judge in Jennings nor those who considered fingerprint
evidence throughout the decade following Jennings expressed
concern about any of these matters. This failure to scrutinize
fingerprinting is quite extraordinary: based only on interested
participants' say-so, judges basically accepted the notion that
the new technique worked flawlessly. To be sure, in Jennings,
there were four full prints left in the paint, not one.1" But even
so, it is remarkable that the judge in Jennings felt so confident
about fingerprinting as a viable identification technique that
he saw the reliability of the system as a fair subject for judicial
'9 Jennings, 96 N.E.2d at 1082.
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notice.2" His main grounds for this confidence, in addition to
the experts' testimony, was that fingerprinting was already so
widely used in a variety of other contexts.21
As we have seen, the important differences between
using fingerprints as a criminal identification method and
using fingerprints for forensic identification suggest that the
legitimacy of the former should not have been sufficient to
imply the legitimacy of the latter. But quite apart from this
point, the judge in Jennings was simply overstating the extent
of the acceptance of fingerprinting outside the courtroom at the
time. Though a number of prison bureaus and police
departments were using fingerprints to identify criminals and
suspected criminals (the FBI, for example, began
fingerprinting in 1904), they all used fingerprinting as a
supplement to the Berthillon system of anthropomorphic
identification, rather than as a stand-alone identification
method. 2' According to Simon Cole, the author of a recent book-
length study of criminal identification systems, the only
American institutions that identified people on the basis of
fingerprints alone prior to 1910 were civil, rather than
criminal. The military, in particular, regularly took recruits'
fingerprints.23 In 1910, the same year as the Jennings trial,
fingerprinting was used for the first time as the exclusive basis
for criminal identification, to detect recidivist prostitutes in
New York.
24
So fingerprinting was accepted in court because of its
widespread use in other arenas; and yet, in these other arenas,
it was not yet viewed even by its advocates as sufficiently
authoritative to stand on its own for important matters like the
identification of felons and criminal recidivists. In fact, it was
over the course of the second and third decades of the century
that fingerprinting came to dominate anthropometry as the
20 For another early example of grounding judicial acceptance on broader
acceptance, see State v. Cerciello, 90 A. 1112, 1114 (N.J. 1914) (admitting fingerprints
on the basis that those "progressive and scientific tendencies of the age [that] are
manifest in every other department of human endeavor, cannot be ignored in legal
procedure.").
21 Jennings, 96 N.E. at 1082-83.
22 COLE, supra note 12, at 152.
Id. at 153. Fingerprinting was used by itself for the purpose of criminal
identification in a number of other countries. See also id. at 153.
24 Id. at 153-54.
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preferred method of criminal identification. This was precisely
the same period in which fingerprinting evidence came to be
uniformly accepted as forensic evidence as well. It seems fair to
suggest that while the early court cases accepting
fingerprinting drew authority from fingerprinting's widespread
use outside the forensic arena, judicial acceptance of
fingerprinting as evidence in criminal cases may have helped
to increase its perceived authority and reliability outside of the
courtroom as well.
In all events, the Jennings decision proved quite
influential. In the years following Jennings, courts in other
states admitted fingerprints without any substantial analysis
at all, relying instead on Jennings and other cases as
precedent. 25 By 1918, a court considering whether palm prints
also ought to be admissible could opine, "Were we dealing here
with a finger print impression.., our course would be easy, for
the courts of this country, and of England as well, have paved
the way for the recognition of this science as an evidentiary
element in criminal prosecutions."26 With respect to palm
prints, the court described how the papillary ridges on the
human hand are, like those on the fingers, "persistent,
continuous and unchanging."27 In deeming palm prints
admissible, the court reached what it called "[an] undisputable
conclusion that there is but one physiological basis underlying
this method of identification; that the phenomenon by which
identity is thus established exists, not only on the bulbs of the
fingertips, but . . . on all parts and in all sections and
subdivisions of the palmar surface of the human hand."28
Once again, this judge failed to ask the hard questions.
Just because there are unchanging permanent marks on the
palms of hands does not necessarily mean that everyone's
palms are identifiably different. Furthermore, even if palm
marks are different, it does not necessarily mean that experts
can identify these differences with a high degree of accuracy.
But by this point-just seven years after the first reception of
fingerprints as evidence in the United States-the evidential
2See, e.g., McGarry v. State, 200 S.W. 527 (1918), People v. Sallow, 100 Misc.
447, 453, 165 N.Y. Supp. 915, 918 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1917).
26 State v. Kuhl, 175 P. 190, 191 (Nev. 1918).
I id. at 193.
2id. at 194.
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legitimacy of fingerprints was so deeply entrenched that palm
prints seemed but a straightforward analogical extension of
accepted doctrine.29
In Pudd'nhead Wilson, once fingermarks were explained
to the court, their authority seemed almost self-evident.
Similarly, in actual courts, judges expressed remarkably little
skepticism about the authority of fingerprints, accepting them
as legal evidence with tremendous speed and little skepticism."
Occasionally, Pudd'nhead Wilson itself was even cited as an
authority by judges!31 Judges were as confident as Twain that
they had located 'God's finger print language,' that voiceless
speech and the indelible writing" that could provide
"unquestionable evidence of identity in all cases."32
B. In-Court Experiments to Amaze and Persuade
As mentioned earlier, Pudd'nhead Wilson provided an
in-court demonstration of his skill at identifying fingerprints.
He asked for several people in the courtroom to run their
fingers through their hair and then press them against a
window, while the defendants did the same. He then asked the
same people and the defendants to repeat the exercise, on a
different window and in a different order. All of this was to
29 Later, in an even greater analogical stretch, fingerprint identification also
became a justification for the admissibility of expert evidence about toolmark
identification. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 287 P. 18, 20 (Wash. 1930) (admitting a
toolmark identification expert's testimony about whether a particular knife was used
to cut some branches by noting, "Courts are no longer skeptical that by the aid of
scientific appliances the identity of a person may be established by finger prints... The
edge on one blade differs as greatly from the edge on another blade as the lines on one
human hand differ from the lines on another. This is a progressive age. The scientific
means afforded should be used to apprehend the criminal.") Id.
30 This analysis is based on a review of appellate cases and the periodical
literature. It is of course possible that there were isolated instances where a judge at
trial rejected fingerprint evidence, but the exclusion was never appealed. (If, for
example, the prosecution's fingerprint evidence was excluded and the defendant
acquitted, obviously there could be no appeal!) However, if the exclusion of fingerprint
evidence at trial had occurred with any frequency, it seems very likely that the legal
periodical literature would have noted it in passing, neither my own research nor
Cole's has turned up early examples of fingerprinting's evidentiary exclusion.
31 See, e.g., Stacy v. State, 292 P. 885, 886 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930); Kuhl, 175
P. at 191-92.
32 Moon v. State, 198 P. 288, 290 (Ariz. 1921) (quoting FREDERICKA. BRAYLEY,
FINGER PRINTS IDENTIFICATION (1910)); Kuhl, 175 P. at 193 (same).
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take place while Pudd'nhead turned his back.33 The experiment
was a tremendous success; when it was completed, "he moved
to his place through a storm of applause."34 Not only did he
succeed in identifying the defendants and three others by their
fingermarks, but this experiment enormously enhanced
Pudd'nhead's credibility and- the credibility of his claims about
the new technique. Pudd'nhead's experiment made the
onlookers believe both that fingerprints really were different
from one another (never mind that such a small sample size
provided quite limited proof in this regard!) and, perhaps even
more important, that Pudd'nhead really could do what he said
he could: identify people by comparing their fingerprints.
Although there is no particular reason to believe they
were inspired by Twain's depiction, actual fingerprint
examiners offered demonstrations very similar to
Pudd'nhead's. Instead of simply asserting their expertise and
the amazing power of identifying a person from a mark left by
the fingertips, experts often tried to show the jury this power
firsthand. These were, as historian Simon Cole has argued,
"dazzling demonstrations" that made believable and persuasive
a technique that seemed almost magical in its abilities." For
example, in Moon v. State,36 the expert witness was permitted
to perform a fingerprint examination on the twelve jurymen.
Each juror made two prints on separate pieces of cardboard
while the expert was out of the room. When the expert
returned, he developed the prints with powder and successfully
paired them off. The appellate court found no error in the trial
court's having permitted the experiment, declaring it a
"demonstration impressive and convincing."37  The court
concluded: "It seems to have been a fair proposition, fairly
conducted, and tended .. . to illustrate the methods of the
system of finger print identification and the truth of the claim
that invisible finger prints can be developed and identity of the
maker revealed by simple process to positive certainty."3' In the
first two decades of the use of fingerprinting in court, when it
TWAIN, supra note 1, at 161.
34 Id.
35 COLE, supra note 12, at 190-94.
SG 198 P. 288 (Ariz. 1921).
37 Id. at 291.
38 Id.
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was still a relatively novel form of evidence, every appellate
judge who considered the issue found that offering in-court
demonstrations of the power of fingerprinting was acceptable
and legitimate, a useful way to show jurors the power of the
technique. 9
Moreover, sometimes even the offer to test was quite
convincing, as the following perhaps apocryphal but
nonetheless revealing excerpt from a cross-examination of a
fingerprint expert suggests:
Q: Now all this no doubt sounds very nice; bifurcations, deltas,
islands, abrupt terminations, loops that are loops and loops that are
something else, but the question is-can you prove that you can
identify a person by his fingerprints? If you can how are you going to
do it?
A: Yes, sir. I would be only too glad to prove by a
demonstration that I can identify a person by his fingerprints. I
accept any reasonable test that you may suggest.
Q: Now, please remember that you are upon oath. Do you
mean to tell the court and jury, that in this gathering that fills this
room you could identify two prints that were alike out of the whole
number here gathered?
A: Yes, sir; I could without a doubt, but I fear it would try the
patience of the Court. However, I will offer a suggestion upon the
same lines. I am willing to have the jurymen each make an
impression of their left thumb, they putting some private mark upon
it so that they can identify it. I will retire with an officer or with
counsel if he so desires and during my absence one or more jurymen
can make an impression of their thumb on another paper without
any marks to identify it. On my return I will identify the prints that
are alike.
By the prosecutor: If the Court pleases, I think this a very fair
proposition, and on the part of the state, we agree to have this test
made.
By Mr. Sharp: that is all very well for you to say. No doubt you
are on the inside and know how the trick is done, but I-
Prosecutor (interrupting): If your Honor pleases, I positively
object to the word "trick" as applied to my office, myself, or my
39 For other examples of in-court experiments, see People v. Chimovitz, 211
N.W. 650 (Mich. 1927) (describing another fingerprint experiment on the jurors
themselves); Stacy v. State, 292 P. 885 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930) (permitting expert to
pair and identify prints other than the defendant before the jury); Hopkins v. State,
295 S.W. 361 (Ark. 1927) (describing how each juror made a print of one finger, and
then one juror made a second print which was identified by the expert in an in-court
experiment; court found the experiment was perfectly permissible, but reversed on
other grounds).
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attaches. He invited this test and I consider his refusal to have it
made an acknowledgment on his part that the testimony of our
witness is undisputed.
By Mr. Sharp: You can think what you please. I have seen more
astonishing things done by a so-called "mind-reader" and I do not
propose to risk the life of my client by such a performance; this is a
40,trial, not a side-show.
Thus, not only could in-court demonstrations be enormously
persuasive, but the willingness of fingerprint examiners to be
tested by the jury was powerful evidence of their confidence
and their technique.
Fingerprint examiners' willingness, even their
eagerness, to undergo in-court testing stood in pointed contrast
to handwriting identification experts. Handwriting experts also
testified about identifying from marks-not from
fingermarks-but from signatures and other documents, using
their expertise to link a writing with an author. Handwriting
experts, however, never offered to prove their expertise
through in-court experiments, and in fact, on those occasions
when the opposing party endeavored to test their expertise
through a demonstration in court, handwriting experts nearly
always refused, claiming that theirs was an exacting science
that could not be performed in mere minutes as a show for the
jury. They argued that such tests were unreasonable and
misleading, for the process of rendering an opinion on
authorship was not something that could be done in an instant
and upon a careless glance. Rather, they had to study the
document in detail, look at it under a magnifying glass or even
a microscope, and measure, examine, and study the writing
scientifically.4'
While the reluctance of handwriting examiners to
subject themselves to in-court testing may have been
justifiable-not all forms of knowledge are well-suited to near-
instantaneous demonstration-their refusal to submit to in-
court testing inevitably had a negative affect on their perceived
credibility. By contrast, the fingerprint examiners' willingness
40 Finger-Print Testimony in Court, 63 LITERARY DIGEST 22, 22-23 (1919)
(reprinted from Finger-Print Magazine, Aug. 1919).41 See generally ALBERT S. OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (1910) (providing
a detailed description of the procedures used by experts in handwriting evidence in the
same period).
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to be tested enhanced the credibility of their claims
considerably. It may also have helped to blind judges and juries
to that which these fabulous floor shows failed to prove: that
just because an expert could take carefully inked prints and
successfully identify which of a dozen people had made the
print, it said little about (1) whether all fingerprints were in
fact unique; or (2) whether under the less-than-perfect
conditions of real-life fingerprint identification, when prints
were potentially smudged or only partially preserved, they
could identify prints with the same degree of confidence.
C. Showing the Jurors the Evidence for Themselves
The third similarity between the use of fingerprint
evidence in Pudd'nhead Wilson and in actual courts is that the
fingerprints themselves, as much as the expert opinion about
the fingerprints, seem to constitute the evidence. Fingerprint
examiners generally did not simply assert that they believed
they had found a match; they nearly always presented images
of the prints themselves to the jury, so the jury could see the
match for itself. While fingerprint evidence was always
presented through an expert, the expert's real role was to teach
the jury to see the match directly. Thus, the jury examined the
fingerprints found at the scene of the crime and the
fingerprints of the defendant, and saw for itself that they
matched one another.
It is important to emphasize just how powerful this kind
of dramatic demonstrative evidence could be. The jurors saw,
or at least seemed to see, nature displayed directly. They
became witnesses to now visible traces of the crime itself.
Enlarged images of fingerprints could appear both natural and
neutral, a more objective form of proof than mere witness
testimony or even expert ruminations. Seeing the marks
directly could transform fingerprinting from a dubious theory,
"an abstract explanation" perhaps difficult for the jury to
grasp, to an obvious, perhaps even incontestable, truth.42 As
one court described, quoting with approval the state's attorney,
42 Moon, 198 P. at 291.
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It might well be that until a juryman witnessed this demonstration
he would never believe that a plain porcelain slab would reveal the
incriminating finger print, but having seen their own finger prints
developed from invisible impressions on sheets of paper, it was no
longer a question of speculation; it was to the jurymen a fact as
common place as radium or wireless or flying in the air."'
Another judge wrote,
The witness does not testify. The physical facts speak for
themselves; no fears, no hopes, no will of the prisoner to falsify or to
exaggerate could produce or create a resemblance of her finger
prints or change them in one line, an therefore there is no danger of
error being committed or untruth told."
Though this judge was describing why requiring the defendant
to provide a fingerprint did not violate his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, this belief that fingerprints
were "physical facts [that] speak for themselves," without risk
of lies or exaggeration, was more broadly applicable.
Fingerprint examiners generally testified with blown-up
images of the prints themselves, the various points of
resemblance marked to make identification clear and for ease
of reference in their testimony.4  The use of enlarged
photographs to reveal sameness and difference through
intricate patterns and minutiae was a technique that other
forms of experts had used in the past, especially experts in
handwriting identification evidence.4 ' Document experts
routinely presented juries with blown-up images of signatures,
carefully marked for the expert to guide the jury through a
lesson on handwriting identification. These experts were self-
conscious about the fact that their visual evidence practically
spoke for itself; the goal was to have visual exemplars that
43 Id. at 291.
4People v. Sallow, 100 Misc. 447, 165 N.Y.S. 915 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess.
N.Y. County 1917).
45 Interestingly, Simon Cole reports that some present-day fingerprint
examiners now use a generic chart of two matching fingerprints in place of the actual
prints at issue in the case. See Simon Cole, Witnessing Identification: Latent
Fingerprinting Evidence and Expert Knowledge, 28 SOC. STUD. SCI. 687, 692 (1998)
[hereinafter Cole, Witnessing Identification].
46 On the history of handwriting identification evidence, see Jennifer L.
Mdnookin, Scripting Expertise: Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial
Construction of Reliability, __ VA. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2001).
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made the expert's conclusion seem positively self-evident.
Fingerprint experts saw that the use of visual depictions of
fingerprints could be a powerful rhetorical strategy, and they
were right.
D. A Language of Fact, Not Opinion
From its earliest uses as legal evidence, fingerprint
identification was generally presented in the language of
certainty, rather than in the language of opinion. Pudd'nhead
does not simply say that he believes he knows whose prints are
on the knife. It's not simply his opinion; it's a fact, a natural
truth, indisputable and certain. The typical, though not
exclusive, practice in the late nineteenth century was for
experts to testify as to their opinion.47 But from the very
beginning, fingerprint examiners resisted this norm. In
Jennings, for example, one of the grounds upon which the
defendant claimed error on appeal was that the experts failed
to qualify their judgments as mere opinion, but rather testified
"that the two sets of prints were made by the fingers of the
same person."' The appellant complained that failing to testify
in the form of an opinion was improper and constituted error,
but the court disagreed, holding:
While it is usual for expert witnesses to testify that they believe or
think, or in their best judgment, that such and such a thing is true,
no rule of law prevents them from testifying positively on such
subjects. It is for the jury to determine the weight to be given to
their testimony.
49
Speaking in the language of certainty-rather than the
language of possibility or probability-became the standard
operating procedure for fingerprint identification evidence. One
of the hallmarks of fingerprint identification evidence is the
now-institutionalized reluctance of fingerprint examiners to
testify in the language of probability. According to the norms of
the professional community, identifications must be certain
and absolute, or they must not be made at all. In fact, the
47 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1218-1919 (1904).48 Jennings, 96 N.E. at 1077.
49 Id.
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primary professional organization for fingerprint examiners,
the International Association for Identification, passed a
resolution in 1979 making it professional misconduct for any
fingerprint examiner to provide courtroom testimony that
labeled a match "possible, probable or likely" rather than
-certain."0
This emphasis on certainty was aided by the visual
strategies the experts used. To whatever extent the
fingerprints spoke for themselves, the expert could make it
seem that he or she was just reporting the facts. He could
present himself as a spokesperson for nature rather than an
interpreter of evidence. Note, for example, how one fingerprint
examiner describes the technique and its power:
This science must not be confused with "palmistry," that
pretended art by which the charlatan and faker for a consideration
pretends that he can foretell future events. Nor is it to be
confounded with the operations of the Handwriting Expert, who is
only able at the best to give an opinion as the possibility of two
writings having been made by the same person. It has no connection
with the Bertillon System of identification, which depends upon
measurements taken from certain members and portions of the
human body, relying especially upon the length of certain bones.
Any or all of these methods are subject to error, and there is
always an element of doubt in their findings that make their
conclusions unreliable. Two experts in any or all of these methods,
can and do disagree because their conclusions are based entirely
upon possibilities. The finger-print expert has only facts to consider;
he reports simply what he finds. The lines of identification are either
there or they are absent. If two prints are identical in every
particular, they were made by the same person. If they are different,
they were not made by the same person.
No matter how many finger print experts may be engaged in the
51labor of comparing two prints, their verdict must be the same.
Very occasionally, courts resisted fingerprint examiners'
insistence upon speaking in a language of certainty rather
than probability. While the court recognized in a 1930 case
Resolution VII, 29 Identification News (Aug. 1979). The next year the
resolution was amended to make it clear that it applied only to examiners who made a
probabilistic identification on their own initiative (rather than, say, under threat of a
contempt citation). See Resolution VII Amended, Identification News 3 (Aug. 1980).
r Fingerprint Testimony in Court, supra note 40, at 22.
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that fingerprint evidence was generally admissible, it balked at
the experts' testimony because it was not in the form of an
opinion. The experts testified
to the ultimate fact that the finger prints on the broken pieces of
glass were the finger prints of the appellant ... It is to be noticed
that the expert witnesses were not asked to express an opinion on
the subject .... [Wie are not disposed to change the rule which has
been established in this court for many years to the effect that while
an expert may be permitted to express his opinion, or even his belief,
he cannot testify as to the ultimate fact that must be determined by
the jury.
5 2
The case provoked an outraged dissent, arguing first that
whether the fingerprints matched was not the ultimate fact in
the case, but rather, whether the defendant was guilty of the
crime charged. In addition,
[flinger printing is based on the law of nature, or upon a universally
recognized physical fact. All authorities on the subject recognize that
the finger prints of no two persons are the same. In all the
thousands of finger prints now in the repositories of the United
States Army, United States Navy, insurance companies, or in the
bureaus of investigation of every city throughout the entire world,
there has never been found the finger prints of any two persons
exactly the same .... Finger printing is a science. Finger prints are
subject to classification. Finger prints are universally recognized as
a means of identification throughout the world.
53
The opinion in this case was very unusual, the perspective of
the dissent far more the norm. Generally, fingerprint
examiners were allowed to testify about identity as if it were
fact, not opinion.
Overall, what we see in the early history of
fingerprinting is enormously rapid acceptance by courts
without a great deal of careful scrutiny. Sometimes experts
would show their own prowess and the power of fingerprint
identification by offering in-court experiments, where the juries
could witness firsthand the miracles of fingerprinting. The use
of visual representations of the fingerprints themselves,
carefully marked to emphasize the points of similarity, was
r2 State v. Steffen, 230 N.W. 536, 538 (Iowa, 1930).
"Id. at 539-40 (DeGraff, J., dissenting).
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part and parcel of the presentation of fingerprint evidence in
court. Finally, from the earliest use of fingerprinting, experts
attempted to distinguish their knowledge from other forms of
expert testimony, by declaring that they offered not opinion but
fact, not probability but certainty-and notwithstanding the
occasional exception, courts permitted them to testify in this
way.
II. UNDERSTANDING FINGERPRINTING'S EASY
ACCEPTANCE
This history of fingerprinting as legal evidence raises an
obvious question: why was fingerprinting so readily accepted
by courts? We have seen that judges were willing, even eager,
to declare fingerprinting admissible; why is it that they did not
subject the new identification technique to more scrutiny?
Law professor Michael Saks has addressed this question
in a recent article on the history of forensic science." Saks
argues that early twentieth century courts simply were not in
the habit of scrutinizing scientific evidence, relying mostly on
an informal, and implicit, "marketplace test" in which those
who succeeded in making a living from their expertise
presumably had sufficient expertise to testify in court." Courts'
nonchalant acceptance of fingerprinting, Saks argues, stemmed
from their failure to recognize that fingerprinting had no
external commercial marketplace, and ought therefore to be
subject to more serious scrutiny. 6 Moreover, the judicial habit
of relying on precedent created a snowballing effect: once a
number of courts accepted fingerprinting as evidence, later
courts simply followed their lead rather than investigating the
merits of the technique for themselves."
Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1998).
rs Id.; see generally David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present and Worrying
about the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799 (1994) (providing a
more detailed description of the "commercial marketplace test").
Saks, supra note 54 at 1104.
I7 d. at 1105.
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As far as it goes, Saks' explanation is certainly correct.
In the early twentieth century, there was no doctrinally
mandated gatekeeping approach to expert evidence like those
that apply today, whether the Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals test of reliability and validity," or the Frye v.
United States test of general acceptance59 in the relevant
scientific community. There was no clearly defined standard
for how "expert" an expert had to be; determining expertise
was thought to be a concrete matter, determined case-by-case,
depending on the "fitness of the individual witness, as shown
by the circumstances of his experience."" Moreover, the
determination of both the qualifications of the particular
expert and the admissibility of the expert's testimony were
generally thought to be within the trial judge's discretion,
reviewable either not at all or only for abuse of discretion. 61 But
even though there were not clearly articulated rules for
determining the admissibility of expert evidence, we should not
believe that courts allowed all forms of expert testimony.62 We
still need some further explanation for why courts felt no need
to scrutinize fingerprinting with any care. I will offer three
further explanations, none of them fully satisfying on its own,
but in combination can help to explain why fingerprinting
became accepted, routinized, and even deemed infallible
without much careful scrutiny by judges.
First, fingerprinting and its claims that individual
distinctiveness was marked on the tips of the fingers had
inherent cultural plausibility. The notion that identity and
even character could be read from the physical body was widely
shared, both in popular culture and in certain more
professional and scientific arenas as well. Berthillonage, for
example, the measurement system widely used by police
departments across the globe, was based on the notion that if
people's bodies were measured carefully, they inevitably
58 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
59 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
GO 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 560 (1904).
61 See id. at § 561. Of course, according to G.E. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1977),
the standard of review for determinations of admissibility of expert evidence remains
abuse of discretion.
62 For a case study of a form of expert testimony that only gradually came to be
accepted by courts, see Mnookin, supra note 46.
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differed one from the other. Similarly, Lombrosion criminology
and criminal anthropology, influential around the turn of the
century, had, as its basic tenet, that born criminals differed
from normal, law-abiding citizens in physically identifiable
ways.63 Many thought that criminality could be located by
taking pictures and making measurements. For example,
eugenicist Francis Galton, one of the developers of an early
fingerprint classification system, believed composite
photographs of criminals could reveal the existence of criminal
archetypes."'
More generally, the very belief in nature's infinite
variety meant that just as every person was different, just as
every snowflake was unique, every fingerprint must be
distinctive too, if it were only examined in sufficient detail.
Individual distinctiveness was taken for granted, and it was
further believed that this distinctiveness was inevitably
marked upon the human body if one only knew where to look.
The idea that upon the tips of fingers were minute patterns,
fixed from birth and unique to the carrier made cultural sense;
it fit with the order of things. It was, to borrow Jack Balkin's
phrase, a cultural meme, one destined to flourish and spread.
One could argue, from the vantage point of one hundred
years of experience, that the reason fingerprinting seemed so
plausible at the time was because its claims were true, rather
than because it fit within a particular cultural paradigm or
ideology. But this would be the worst form of Whig history.
Many of the other circulating beliefs of the period, such as, for
example, criminal anthropology, are now quite discredited. The
reason fingerprinting was not subject to scrutiny by judges was
not because it obviously "worked." In fact, as discussed below,
it may have become obvious that it worked in part precisely
because it was not subject to careful scrutiny.
The second reason fingerprinting was easily assimilated
as legal evidence was, quite simply, because it was visible. As
mentioned earlier, fingerprints turned jurors into virtual
witnesses who could peer upon the prints and see the swirls
See, e.g., NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN CRIMINALS 110-112 (1997).
6ALLAN SEKULA, THE BODY AND THE ARCHIVE 39 (1986).
" On the notion of cultural memes, see JACK BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE
(1998).
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and whorls for themselves. They could even peer down at their
own fingertips for comparison. Just as this visibility of the
evidence offered a way of persuading juries of the identity of
two prints, it also offered a way of persuading judges of the
legitimacy of the technique. All jurors and judges had to do was
believe the evidence of their own eyes. Although learning to see
a match required skill and judgment, experts used enlarged
images with the similarities between prints carefully
numbered, to help the jurors see the identification firsthand.
Given that matches were so visible, that they could be
brought into focus before the court and jury, it is not surprising
that judges failed to take the step from noticing a match to
asking difficult interpretive questions about the meaning of a
match. In fact, for non-scientific evidence of identity, judges did
not (and still do not) require evidence about base rates as a
prerequisite to admissibility. If someone testifies that the
perpetrator had a mole, or was wearing a green shirt, or
walked with a golden cane, we require no evidence of just how
often people have moles or wear green shirts or carry canes in
order to allow the testimony. We can, perhaps, distinguish
between these forms of ordinary identity evidence and
fingerprinting by suggesting that we do not need evidence
about base rates because jurors have some intuition, as part of
their everyday common sense, about how often people have any
of these traits. But how much faith can we have that these
juror intuitions are accurate? In fact, these forms of lay
identity evidence raise both of the same potential problems as
fingerprinting: observation errors and errors in evaluating the
frequency of occurrence. That is, a lay observer might think the
perpetrators of some crime were an interracial couple (and
hence that they "match" the characteristics of the interracial
-couple charged with the crime) when in fact they were not. Or
the factfinder might, upon hearing the witness' testimony,
misestimate the frequency of interracial couples.66 Similarly,
with fingerprinting, there are potential problems resulting
from both mistaken evaluations of whether a match exists and
66 I draw this example, obviously, from the now-classic opinion in People u.
Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1986), a leading case on the dangers of statistical evidence.
See generally Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971) (describing problems with the legal use of
statistical evidence).
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from inadequate knowledge of the likelihood that someone
other than the defendant might also match. With lay identity
evidence, these concerns are generally understood to go to the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.
My point in illustrating the similarity between the
limits of what was understood about fingerprinting and the
problems of lay identity evidence is that judges could have
understandably believed, based on the early examiners'
thousands of datapoints, that even if fingerprinting was not
perfect, it offered better proof of identity than lay identification
testimony. To be fair, this argument -is a bit disingenuous;
there is little evidence that early judges even noticed the
problems with defining and interpreting fingerprint matches,
much less chose to dismiss them as insignificant or as affecting
weight rather than admissibility. However, in People v.
Roach,67 the judge did offer this kind of logic:
The fact that error may sometimes result in effecting identification
by this means affords no reason for the exclusion of such evidence.
Mistakes may also occur in effecting identification by personal
appearance, casual meeting, by handwriting, or by one's voice heard
in the dark or over the telephone, but evidence of this character is
admissible and its weight is to be determined by the jury.
68
Generally, however, fingerprint experts claimed to offer certain
knowledge, facts rather than opinions, incontestable proof of
identity rather than a shared characteristic that suggested
identity. If fingerprinting had not made such strong claims for
its own authority, the judicial acceptance without scrutiny, by
analogy to other forms of identification evidence, would have
made more sense. But this insistence that fingerprinting was
fundamentally different because it was infallible ought to have
invited judges to demand additional proof of its infallibility. It
was, in part, the dazzling visual power of the fingerprint match
that blinded judges to the need to ask difficult questions about
a match's meaning.
67 215 N.Y. 592, 109 N.E. 618 (1915).
'Id. at 605, 109 N.E. at 623.
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Moreover-and this is the third explanation for
fingerprinting's rapid assimilation into legal evidence-the
strong claim of certain, incontestable knowledge made
fingerprinting especially appealing, not only to prosecutors but
to judges as well. There was an especially powerful fit between
fingerprinting and what the legal system wanted science to
provide. As I argue elsewhere, in the late nineteenth century,
legal commentators and judges saw in expert testimony the
potential for a particularly authoritative mode of evidence, a
kind of knowledge that could have been and should have been
far superior to that of mere eyewitnesses, whose weaknesses
and limitations were beginning to be better understood.69
Courtroom observers and judges aspired to have "the
light of scientific truth," as one writer described it, shine
directly into the courtroom." Legal writers hoped that science,
with its privileged access to the natural world, could provide
certainty and objectivity. As one commentator colorfully
asserted, the ideal expert evidence would occupy "an exalted
and honorable throne in the realm of truth," for his "recognized
and enlightened conclusions [would be] as much a matter of
fact as the law of gravitation and the motion of heavenly
bodies."7 Judges and legal commentators were in search of
methods for making authoritative judgments, trustworthy and
credible mechanisms by which the jury could determine facts.
The holy grail was evidence that could simultaneously be
definite and dispositive, a way to find the truth beneath the
contradictions of witnesses.
Expert evidence held out the promise of offering such a
superior method of proof, rigorous, disinterested, and objective.
But in practice, scientific evidence almost never lived up to
these hopes. Instead, at the turn of the century, as one lawyer
griped, the testimony of experts had become "the subject of
everybody's sneer and the object of everybody's derision. It has
become a newspaper jest. The public has no confidence in
expert testimony." 2 Experts perpetually disagreed. Too often,
"Jennifer L. Mnookin, Images of Evidence, (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, M.I.T.) (on file in M.I.T. Library and with the author).70 Poore's Reply to Kinney, 4 AM. LAW. 204, 204 (1896).
71 H.C. White, The Medical Expert, 3 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 27, 27-28 (1897).
72 Henry Wollman, Physicians-Expert Witnesses. Some Reforms, 17 MEDICO-
LEGAL J. 20, 20 (1899).
[Vol. 67: 1
FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE
experts were quacks or partisans, and even when they were
respected members of their profession, their evidence turned
out to be inconsistent and conflicting. Nineteenth century
judges and commentators were frustrated and disillusioned by
the actual use of expert evidence in court, and often said so in
their opinions. As one judge wrote in 1899,
It seems that if a person is called as a witness to support one side of
a controversy by [expert] opinion evidence, he is quite likely to
espouse such side with all the zeal of blind partisanship ... inducing
a mental condition of entire incapability of giving an independent,
impartial opinion, and capability only of acting in the line which the
interest of the one side suggests, with as much certain as the
hypnotized follows the mental suggestion of the hypnotizer.
Even if experts did not become zealous partisans, the
very fact of disagreement was a problem. It forced juries to
choose between competing experts, even though the central
justification for using expert testimony was that the jury
lacked the expertise to make its own determination. Learned
Hand bemoaned this problem in an article on expert testimony
in 1901.
The trouble, is that it is setting the jury to decide, where doctors
disagree. The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not facts,
as we have seen, but general truths derived from his specialized
experience. But how can the jury judge between two statements each
founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own?
It is just because they are incompetent for such a task that the
expert is necessary at all.... What hope have the jury, or any other
layman, of a rational decision between two such conflicting
statements each based upon such experience.
4
Baxter v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co, 80 N.W. 644, 653 (Wis. 1899); see also
Arthur J. Eddy, What Reforms in the Nature of Expert Testimony are Advisable, 58
ALB. L.J. 251, 251 (1898) (noting "It is amazing the number of hard things which the
courts of last resort have said about expert testimony; a volume quite as large as the
Illinois Statutes could be compiled of condemnatory phrases and languages."). See also
E.E.S. Wood, Medical Testimony, 7 AM. LAW. 92, 94 (1899).
74 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40, 54-55 (1901). For a recent version of this criticism
about present-day expert testimony, see Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and
Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998).
2001]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Instead of shining the great light of science into the courtroom,
expert evidence at the turn of the century was deemed, in
practice, to be an embarrassing spectacle, reflecting badly on
science and law alike.
In this context, fingerprinting seemed to offer
something astonishing. Fingerprinting-unlike the evidence of
physicians, chemists, handwriting experts, surveyors or
engineers-seemed to offer the kind of solid, indisputable
evidence that was hoped for from science. Writers on
fingerprinting routinely emphasized that fingerprint
identification could not be erroneous, or that its results were
both consistent and certain. Unlike so much other expert
evidence, which could be and generally was disputed by other
qualified experts, fingerprint examiners seemed always to
agree. Generally, the defendants in fingerprinting cases did not
offer fingerprint experts of their own. Because no one
challenged in court either fingerprinting's theoretical
foundations or, for the most part, its actual operation in any
particular instance, the technique came to seem especially
powerful. Fingerprinting therefore offered precisely the kind of
scientific certainty that judges and commentators, weary of the
perpetual battles of the experts, yearned for.
Fingerprinting gained tremendous authority from the
claim that a match could not be made erroneously. Initial
challenges to this claim only resulted in increasing
fingerprinting's clout. For example, an article published in
1911 told the story of a man who was charged with loitering
with an intent to commit a felony, and whose fingerprints were
introduced at the trial to prove he was a recidivist; his prints
had been taken at the time of his last conviction. But the
defendant claimed he was not the same person whose
fingerprints were shown, and had papers indicating that he
was in the army at the time of conviction. This was quite a
shock: "This event was naturally disconcerting, for
identification by finger-prints had been regarded as infallible;
and many declared (and not without reason) that this single
failure should discredit the whole system."75 But the belief in
the infallibility of fingerprinting survived the ordeal: it turned
75 James W. Garner, Infallibility of Finger-Print Evidence, 11 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 275 (1911).
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out that the army papers had been stolen. The message was
clear: if the fingerprints contradicted other evidence in a case,
the other evidence must be erroneous.
That fingerprints could provide certain, definite
matches was not contested in court. In the early trials in which
fingerprints were introduced, defendants argued that
fingerprinting was not a legitimate form of evidence, but
typically defendants did not introduce fingerprint experts of
their own.76 Fingerprinting somehow avoided the spectacle of
clashing, competing experts whose contradictory testimony
befuddled jurors and frustrated judges. Instead, the evidence
that a defendant's fingerprints matched those found at the
scene of a crime was typically uncontested.
And because it was uncontested, fingerprint evidence
came to be seen as uncontestable. Fingerprinting grew to have
cultural authority that far surpassed that of any other forensic
science. It came to be seen as an especially powerful, especially
compelling form of evidence, one that simply could not be
challenged as erroneous.77  Because the reliability of
fingerprinting was not challenged in court, it came to have a
great deal of epistemological authority-both within the
courtroom and outside it. That fingerprinting is generally
viewed as a tremendously reliable technique hardly needs to be
established-it is common knowledge, almost beyond dispute.
To give just a limited sense of the extent to which
fingerprint identification has been seen as certain and
infallible, consider just two examples. First, Simon Cole details
how, in 1992, investigators uncovered widespread fingerprint
fabrication by New York State policemen, forty cases over eight
years. Many of the fabrications were amateurish and would
76 For one partial exception, see Johnson v. State, 249 S.W. 1056 (Tex. 1923), a
murder case in which an expert testified for the prosecution that there was insufficient
basis to compare bloody handmarks on the axe to those of the defendant. In a motion
for new a trial, appellant attached the affidavit of a fingerprint expert, who said that
the marks on the axe did not match either the defendant or his alleged co-conspirator.
The appellate court denied the motion, on the grounds that the expert's opinion was
not newly discovered evidence; it is, however, an instance of a defendant offering the
expert oinion of a fingerprint examiner in his own behalf, albeit too late.
Defendants could challenge fingerprint evidence in other ways: they could
argue that their presence at the scene of the crime did not prove that they were the
perpetrator; they could argue that they were framed and their fingerprints planted so
as to incriminate them falsely, and so forth. But it was not viewed as credible to argue
that the fingerprints declared to be a match were not, in fact, a match.
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have been easily detected upon careful inspection, but not a
single one was challenged by the defense. As Cole writes,
the scandal revealed the extent of the trust extended to fingerprint
examiners, how little defense attorneys scrutinize fingerprint
evidence, and how rare is the retention of an expert by the defense.
In their confessions, the troopers themselves acknowledged that
they chose to fabricate fingerprint evidence because they knew it
would go unquestioned, because it was so thoroughly trusted.
78
Second, when DNA identification methods were first
used, their inventors called the new technique "DNA
fingerprinting," purposefully attempting to piggyback on the
tremendous power that fingerprinting was known to have.79 We
thus see that fingerprinting's easy acceptance resulted, in part,
from the fact that it seemed to offer a genuine version of the
idealized vision of scientific evidence: certain, secure
knowledge of identity, free of embarrassing disagreements
between so-called experts. To quote again from the expert
mentioned earlier, "No matter how many finger print experts
may be engaged in the labor of comparing two prints, their
verdict must be the same." °
This leads to an ancillary question: why weren't there
disputes among fingerprint examiners? Why didn't
fingerprinting follow the pattern of nearly every other form of
expertise used in the courtroom, in which competing experts
often sharply disagreed? Simon Cole takes up this question,
and his answer is quite suggestive: he emphasizes the
professional culture and shared norms of fingerprint
examiners. Fingerprint examiners created norms of
identification that were so conservative that they precluded
disagreement. Very rapidly, he argues, fingerprint examiners
recognized that the way to maintain their authority was to
maintain unanimity, and the way to maintain unanimity was
78 COLE, supra note 12, at 274-81.
79 One early DNA profiling case criticized the term for exactly this reason: "We
elect not to use the descriptive phrase 'DNA fingerprinting' because . . . the word
fingerprinting tends to suggest erroneously that DNA testing of the type involved in
this case will identify conclusively, like real fingerprinting, the one person in the world
who could have left the identifying evidence at the crime scene." Commonwealth v.
Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 n.2 (Mass. 1991).
80 Finger-Print Testimony in Court, supra note 40, at 22.
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to allow only conservative interpretations of a match.81
Therefore, fingerprint examiners were only supposed to declare
a match if they were entirely certain about it.
Moreover, they did not simply have to be certain
themselves; they also had to believe that every other qualified
fingerprint examiner would agree with them. They were
supposed to gain actual confirmation from colleagues, or at a
minimum, imagine another qualified fingerprint examiner
looking over their shoulder, and declare a match only if they
were confident this real or virtual examiner would agree with
them.82 When they had any doubt, experts were to refrain from
making an identification, declaring only that the prints were
"inconclusive." To the extent that examiners' conclusions truly
were this conservative, it meant that any time a print
examiner declared a match, there simply was no one who
would disagree-by definition, every qualified examiner would
also find that the prints in question matched. The examiners
thereby policed their own conclusions, and through such
effective self-policing, guaranteed that there was no one who
could challenge their matches in court.83
Cole's explanation is fascinating, but not fully
explanatory. The power of these norms is clear, but how did
they emerge, and just how widespread did they become? Even
if fingerprinting had more cultural authority because of this
conservative approach to determining matches, and hence
fingerprint examiners were better off on average, how did these
conservative norms come into being in the first place? Without
any central, official organization of fingerprint experts, how did
experts overcomb the typical collective action problems that
would make such norms hard to instantiate? And even if these
norms were widespread, why didn't individual fingerprint
experts opt out, recognizing that they might be able to profit
from a willingness to make an identification that others were
reluctant to make? There might have been reputational costs to
challenging these norms, but we might have expected some
experts to be willing to increase business even at some
"' Cole, Witnessing Identification, supra note 45.
82 id.
8 Id.
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potential cost to their reputation.8 Given that there was no
mechanism by which to enforce the fingerprint examiners'
norms apart from potential reputational sanctions, why didn't
some experts violate the norms? Why weren't there experts
willing to rely on fewer points of identification, or to explain
away a seeming divergence between prints as an artifact?
Perhaps most significantly, why weren't there defense experts
in fingerprinting?
Part of the answer must be that the early experts
worked for the police, typically emerging from the police
bureaus of identification, and hence were naturally allied with
the prosecution. But this cannot be a fully satisfactory
explanation, for some fingerprint experts could have broken
ranks and gone into business for themselves. Yet another part
of the explanation may lie in the kinds of cases in which
fingerprints were used: many of the early cases involving
fingerprinting were robberies and murders. Perhaps
defendants in these cases did not generally have the means to
pay for experts of their own. This too, cannot be a complete
explanation, for even if the average defendant could not afford
to challenge the fingerprint evidence introduced against him,
surely there would have been a number of well-endowed
defendants who could.
Another part of the answer may simply lie in just how
quickly fingerprinting came to be seen as authoritative: once
fingerprinting was generally viewed as incontestable, why
waste time trying to challenge it? If fingerprinting was seen to
be, as one judge put it, "a law of nature" and "a universally
recognized physical fact," 5 for a defense attorney to spend time
and effort attempting to challenge it would perhaps have been
seen as quixotic, nothing more than tilting at windmills. This
explanation, though it verges on the tautological, may also be
the most persuasive. Fingerprint evidence was accepted so
quickly and so thoroughly that reasonable people, even
reasonable defendants and reasonable defense attorneys,
simply thought it was beyond dispute. For whatever
Look, for example, at expert evidence in general: many well-qualified experts
have been willing to say things in court that might not pass muster with their
colleagues.
Steffen, 230 N.W. at 539 (DeGraff, J., dissenting).
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combination of reasons-the norms of the fingerprint
community, the experts' ties to the prosecution and the
apparatus of the state, the great cultural authority of
fingerprinting, defendants' resources and their attorneys'
expectations-defense experts in fingerprinting simply did not
emerge in the early history of fingerprinting evidence.
Although some present-day defendants do retain a
fingerprint expert of their own, what is striking, even
astonishing, is that no serious effort to challenge either the
weight or admissibility of fingerprint evidence ever emerged-
until 1999.6 One consequence of DNA profiling and its
admissibility into court is that it has opened the door to
challenging fingerprinting. Some of the limitations on
fingerprinting research became more obvious and more visible
only after DNA profiling was subjected to a series of legal
challenges. Such challenges prompted additional research into
population genetics and the statistical foundation of a match
probability and led to increased specificity in defining precisely
how to determine when two DNA profiles "matched."7
III. LESSONS FROM THE PAST
We have thus seen that fingerprinting became
established and believed without rigorous testing of its claims.
Now, it is easy to tell a just-so story about this history, a story
that would make it relatively unimportant for modern-day
analysts of expert evidence. We could say that nineteenth
century judges did not scrutinize fingerprinting (or other
forensic sciences) carefully; luckily for all of us, in the case of
fingerprinting, their instincts were right. Therefore, we need
not worry about our predecessors' failure to test fingerprinting
evidence, first because fingerprint identification evidence turns
out to work just fine, and second because now we do scrutinize
expert evidence with greater care by requiring that its
proponent show that it is generally accepted or scientifically
8 The first Daubert challenge to fingerprinting was U.S. v. Mitchell, No. 96-
407 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
See infra Part III.B.
8Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). General acceptance is
the touchstone of the Frye test, based on a 1923 case involving an early version of the
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reliable89 before deeming it admissible. Therefore, we present-
day interlocutors of evidence need not see any warnings that
apply to us in this history. We can see the origins of fingerprint
evidence as offering nothing more than a confirmation of our
greater sophistication about science. We can largely dismiss
the turn-of-the-century history of fingerprinting as simply an
illustration of the problems of another era.
But this story, intuitively appealing as it may be, is not
as obvious as it appears. Perhaps surprisingly, if we look at the
earliest history of DNA profiling, we can see some striking
similarities to the judicial response to fingerprinting. DNA
profiling has spurred an enormous amount of legal
commentary; I am not attempting to provide a complete or
detailed history of its use. Instead, I will focus on two of the
earliest opinions admitting DNA profiling to show that some of
the very first judges who confronted the technique tended to
admit it with limited scrutiny.
A. The Initial Judicial Response to DNA Evidence
Let us take as a starting point the first appellate
criminal case in which the admissibility of DNA evidence was
challenged: State v. Andrews."
First, just as the early fingerprint cases relied primarily
on the testimony of police identification experts-hardly
impartial assessors of fingerprinting!-the prosecution in this
case relied substantially on the testimony of forensic scientists
who worked at Lifecodes, the company whose DNA
identification tests were at issue in the case.91 Wlien the
appellant objected to these witnesses as having "a built-in bias
lie detector. Although not terribly influential at the time, the Frye test-whether a
novel form of evidence was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community-
became the dominant test for examining the admissibility of expert evidence in the
1970s and 1980s.
89 Requiring a showing of scientific reliability through a variety of criteria
is the approach taken by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
the Supreme Court's 1993 ruling on the question of how to determine the admissibility
of expert evidence.
90 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1988).
91 To be sure, the prosecution did also introduce the evidence of one academic
expert, a molecular geneticist, but this expert seems to have testified primarily on the
general (and uncontroversial) principles underlying DNA sequencing. Id. at 849 n.9.
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because their reputations and careers are based on DNA
comparison work," the court dismissed their concern, saying:
"Neither Frye nor our evidence code require impartiality...
Further, the point would not appear substantial here given
that... DNA comparison work has a number of uses in fields
other than forensic medicine such as diagnosis and treatment
of disease."92
While the court is surely correct that the testimony of
interested experts should not be dismissed out-of-hand, there
might be a legitimate concern that experts with a professional
and financial stake in the admissibility of a novel technique
are not well positioned to assess its merits objectively. In
addition, the court's blas6 assumption that because DNA
comparison had been widely used in other fields, it need not be
concerned with the experts' biases, seems, at a minimum,
problematic. Just as in the early fingerprinting cases, when
courts failed to recognize important differences between the
forensic and criminal identification uses of the technique, the
Andrews court draws excessive comfort from the fact that DNA
comparison is used for non-forensic purposes as well. In
addition, if the court had taken seriously the Frye test, which
requires a technique to be "generally accepted" by the relevant
expert community,93 it would have been difficult to admit DNA
profiling so quickly. As of 1988, the community that "generally
accepted" the particular protocols and procedures for forensic
identification used by companies like Lifecodes were the
scientists at Lifecodes itself. The procedures and protocols had,
in fact, been subjected to very little outside scrutiny.94
To be sure, the use of DNA profiling for paternity
testing, medical diagnosis, and genetic testing did provide
support for the notion that the principles underlying the test
were already generally accepted. But it told the court nothing
about the distinctive problems of using the test for forensic
identification. For example, forensic samples may be limited in
quantity because they are drawn from traces of biological
material left at the crime scene; in other settings, the
92 id.
" Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
9William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of
the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 56 (1989).
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necessary genetic material can be taken directly from the test
subject in whatever quantity is needed. Similarly, crime scene
samples may be aged, deteriorated, or contaminated with other
substances or even with blood other than that of the
perpetrator's, and any of these could plausibly have effects on
the accuracy of testing."
Moreover, as William Thompson and Simon Ford
pointed out in an important early article assessing the new
technique, the acceptable error rate might be quite different in
a research laboratory than in a forensic setting where
someone's liberty is at stake.96 Because the court was
impressed that DNA has had "extensive nonjudicial use," it did
not examine the ways in which judicial use might raise new
questions and problems. Just as the use of fingerprinting for
identifying criminal recidivists provided a powerful rhetorical
justification for its use as legal evidence, notwithstanding the
important differences between the two spheres, the use of DNA
profiling for nonjudicial purposes blinded the earliest judges to
certain key questions about its use as legal evidence. The
divide between general and well-accepted principles and the
practical application for forensic identification was not
confronted.
Moreover, like the early judges in the fingerprinting
cases, the judge in Andrews seems to have been influenced by a
general belief in the uniqueness of human characteristics. But
to move from this general belief that everyone's DNA, taken in
its entirety, is distinctive, to the belief that unique
identification can emerge from a set of particular genetic
probes, requires several leaps. First, there must be proof that
the sections of DNA examined by the probes are truly
polymorphic-that is to say that in these regions of the DNA
(known as "junk DNA"), there is in fact high variability among
individuals. Although when Andrews was decided, there was
research showing the existence of polymorphic portions of
95 Id. at 56.
" Id. at 56-57 ("Research scientists can tolerate relatively high rates of error
and unreliability in their procedures. Scientific experiments which produce a finding of
interest are usually repeated. . . . The situation in a forensic laboratory is quite
different. Tests are often not repeated .... The most dangerous errors, those which
falsely incriminate someone on whom suspicion has already focused, are likely to go
unchallenged.").
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DNA, little was known about the polymorphism of the specific
probes used in DNA typing. The limited research that had been
done had been conducted by Lifecodes itself, which obviously
had a large stake in the findings." Moreover, when courts were
beginning to declare the first kind of DNA typing used in court
(restriction fragment length polymorphisms, or RFLP), little
research had been completed on either the relevant population
genetics or the extent to which polymorphism might vary
across population subgroups." Nor was there substantial proof
that the various probes produced results that were statistically
independent. But the Andrews court raised none of these
concerns.
In fairness to the Andrews court, the defense at trial
had introduced no experts of its own, so part of the problem
was that the defense failed to educate either the trial judge or
the appellate bench about the difficult questions raised by the
new technology. Perhaps this lapse can explain the lack of
scrutiny. The trial judge heard from impressive-sounding
prosecution experts about an impressive-sounding technique,
while the opposing party attacked the novel technique only
through cross-examination, and perhaps itself failed to
understand the most difficult questions raised by the new
identification method. Note that this failure to introduce
defense experts, shared in a number of the earliest cases on
DNA, marks another similarity with the early fingerprint
cases.
99
However, in the case of DNA profiling, defendants soon
offered their own experts to challenge the new technique. In
People v. Wesley, for example, an extensive and "sharply
contested" hearing was held on the question of DNA typing's
admissibility, producing a transcript over one thousand pages
long.' Although in this case the trial judge wrote a lengthy
opinion that took seriously the defense's concerns about the
I71d. at 72.
98 This later became a very significant issue in assessing DNA profiling.
See, e.g., Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA
Typing, 254 Sci. 1745 (1991).
99 For other DNA profiling cases in which defendants did not introduce expert
evidence on the topic, see, e.g., People v. Huang, 154 A.D.2d 706, 707, 546 N.Y.S.2d
901, 902 (2d Dep't 1989); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 782 (Va. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 605 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
10 People v. Wesley, 140 Misc.2d 306, 533 N.Y.S. 2d 643 (N.Y. Co.Ct. 1988).
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new technique, we can still see some striking similarities
between the court's approach to DNA profiling and the
response of judges to fingerprinting nearly a century earlier.
First, the court's enthusiasm about the potential for the
new technology almost seems to overwhelm its objectivity.
Judge Harris writes:
[I]f DNA Fingerprinting proves acceptable in criminal courts, [it]
will revolutionize the administration of criminal justice. Where
applicable, it would reduce to insignificance the standard alibi
defense. In the area of eyewitness testimony, which has been
claimed to be responsible for more miscarriages of justice than any
other type of evidence, again, where applicable, DNA Fingerprinting
would tend to reduce the importance of eyewitness testimony. And in
the area of clogged calendars and the conservation of judicial
resources, DNA Fingerprinting, if accepted, will revolutionize the
disposition of criminal cases. In short, if DNA Fingerprinting works
and receives evidentiary acceptance, it can constitute the single
greatest advance in the "search for truth," and the goal of convicting
the guilty and acquitting the innocent, since the advent of cross-
examination.
His profound and zealous enthusiasm is reminiscent of those
early legal commentators who were so deeply taken with "God's
finger print language," those who were searching for scientific
evidence that could offer decisive, reliable evidence to trump
conflicting eyewitness accounts. On the one hand, such eager
rhetoric is understandable: if DNA profiling could be relied
upon to identify individuals from trace quantities of genetic
material, it could offer a tremendously powerful form of proof.
But at the same time, the judge's degree of enthusiasm
suggests that, in his desire to believe that the new technique
worked, he might inadvertently fail to take sufficient notice of
its limitations or uncertainties.
The judge in Wesley placed enormous significance on his
belief, based on the expert testimony, that DNA profiling
simply could not produce an erroneous result. As he understood
it, the test would necessarily produce either a correct answer,
or no answer at all. He writes:
101 Id. at 308, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
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A matter of extreme significance ... is that it is impossible under
the scientific principles, technology and procedures of DNA
Fingerprinting (outside of an identical twin), to get a "false
positive"--i.e., to identify the wrong individual as the contributor of
the DNA being tested. If there were insufficient DNA for the test, or
if the test, or any of its steps, were performed improperly, no result
at all would be registered-in other words, the autoradiograph
would be blank.
0 2
Again, we see a parallel to the claim that fingerprinting was an
error-free method of identification that could produce certain,
incontestable knowledge.
The judge's statement on this matter is worth
examining in more detail. First, his belief that it is impossible
"to identify the wrong individual as the contributor of the DNA
being tested"1 3 is simply incorrect. DNA profiling does not
claim to provide more than a probability, a statistic describing
the odds that DNA taken from a random person would match
the DNA in question. If the random match probability is, for
example, one in ten million, that does not necessarily mean
that the suspect is the source of the DNA in question. Rather,
it suggests there is only a one-in-ten-million chance that some
randomly-selected person would have matching DNA. (We
would therefore expect to find a number of matches in a several
hundred million person pool such as the population of the
United States.) In other words it is possible-though the
higher the random match probability, the less probable it is-
for DNA profiling correctly to find a match at several loci, and
for the source DNA nonetheless to have come from someone
other than a suspect °4 In fact, in a 1999 case in England,
precisely such an occurrence took place. Raymond Easton was
charged with burglary after authorities made a "cold hit" with
1021Id. at 319-320, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
103 Id. at 320, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
104 To be fair, the judge does seem partly to recognize this limitation. In the
final sentence of the paragraph quoted above, he writes, "Under the undisputed
testimony received at the hearing, no 'wrong' person, within the established powers of
identity for the test, can be identified by the DNA Fingerprinting test." Id. When the
judge writes of "the established powers of identity for the test," he is presumably
referring to the random match probability. But this too is an odd sentence, for the
point is that it is possible, not likely but possible, for the test to work properly and
nonetheless match the wrong person, because the person truly does match the source
at the tested loci. Presumably, in the judge's parlance, this would be the wrong person,
but not the "wrong" person, whatever "wrong" in quotation marks is supposed to mean.
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his DNA in a DNA database."' His DNA matched the crime
scene DNA at six loci. Because there was only a one in thirty-
seven million chance that a randomly selected person's DNA
would match, Raymond Easton was charged with burgling a
house 200 miles from where he lived. However, after Easton,
who had advanced Parkinson's disease and was unable even to
drive a car, offered an alibi for the night in question, the DNA
was eventually tested at four more loci. This more
sophisticated test showed there was no DNA match after all."6
All charges were dropped. This case illustrates one kind of
error that can be made with DNA: the tests may reveal a
genuine match, even though the suspect did not in fact leave
the source DNA. To be sure, the bigger the denominator in the
match probability, the less probable such a false match
becomes. Moreover, when significant, non-DNA evidence
corroborates the DNA evidence, any risk of error is further
reduced. Still, we can see that the early judges' confidence was,
at a minimum, somewhat overblown.
In addition, the judge's belief that any error in the
process would lead to no result at all, rather than an erroneous
result, is simply misplaced. This again strongly resembles the
way fingerprint advocates described the technique as offering
straightforward fact rather than contestable opinion. For
obvious reasons, the notion of a technique that could not
generate an erroneous false positive was appealing, and the
judge in Wesley clearly deemed this important to his judgment;
recall that he termed it "a matter of extreme significance." 7
The prosecution experts' insistence that false positives were
impossible ought to have set off alarm bells for the judge, not
reassure him. Any human process is capable of errors. At a
minimum, there is always the possibility of outright fraud;
falsifying a match altogether. Moreover, it is possible for the
source DNA to contaminate the suspect's DNA and potentially
lead to an erroneous finding. A sample could also be misread or
'05 See Richard Willing, Mismatch Calls DNA Tests Into Question, USA TODAY,
Feb. 8, 2000, at 3A James Chapman & Julie Moult, DNA Test Blunder Nearly Landed
Me in Jail, DAILY MAIL (London), Feb. 11, 2000, at 23.
10 Chapman & Moult, supra note 105.
107 Wesley, 140 Misc.2d at 319, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
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misinterpreted.' In the earliest proficiency tests of DNA
profiling techniques, one laboratory, Cellmark, made one error
in the fifty samples it analyzed, by declaring a match where
none existed."9 Instead of being inherently impossible, false
positives turn out to be a fact of life.
This brief survey shows that some of the judges who
first examined the admissibility of DNA profiling were inclined
to admit it with great enthusiasm and with an incomplete
understanding of the potential pitfalls in applying this
powerful and exciting new technology. Put simply, the earliest
courts that confronted DNA profiling were nearly as dazzled by
its claims and power as their forbears were dazzled by
fingerprinting.
B. Challenges to DNA Evidence
But there is an enormous difference between the history
of DNA profiling and the history of fingerprinting. In the case
of DNA profiling evidence, increasingly sophisticated defense
challenges to the new technology continued to emerge, with
extremely credentialed university scientists as experts. These
experts challenged the infallibility of the new technique on a
variety of dimensions, from the appropriateness of assumptions
about population genetics, to the care with which laboratories
developed standards and executed procedures. The controversy
spilled from the courtroom into the scientific arena, as leading
geneticists and biologists aired their disagreements in the
pages of Science and other journals."0 The debate then spread
into the public policy arena as well, as the National Research
Council convened two distinguished panels to try to sort
through the issues and questions that had arisen and to
generate consensus. A number of courts even held DNA
evidence inadmissible."'
103 For a general discussion of the possibility of error, see, e.g., NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 80-85 (1996).
'09 See, e.g., Roger Parloff, More DNA Tests Facing Challenges, MANHATTAN
LAW., June 20, 1989, at 1; Thompson & Ford, supra note 94.
10 Compare, e.g., R.C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in
Forensic DNA Typing, 254 SCI. 1745 (1991) with Ranajit Charkraborty & Kenneth K.
Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 SCI. 1736 (1991).
. For a list of trial and appellate courts that held DNA inadmissible between
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The substance of the disagreements about DNA
evidence has been documented at tremendous length. I will
describe them below, in quite general terms and schematically,
to provide the flavor of the controversy and to show, in the next
section, that the dimensions along which DNA evidence was
challenged resemble the arguments presently being levied
against fingerprinting.
1. Determining Whether Two Autoradiographs Match
The critical issue in evaluating DNA evidence is
determining whether two samples match. But what exactly are
the proper criteria for declaring a match? This issue arose in
two different ways in People v. Castro, the first DNA case in
which a judge ended up excluding, in part, the DNA evidence."'
First, Lifecodes, the company that analyzed the DNA, had
reported that it determined matches both through visual
comparison, and by measuring the matches and ensuring that
they matched, within a particular standard of error. However,
two of the bands in the case did not "match" according to the
laboratories' own definitions of how a match should be
measured."' Furthermore, it seemed that Lifecodes was using
different definitions of a match for determining, on the one
hand, whether the suspect's DNA matched that from the crime
scene, and on the other hand, how frequently a particular
1989 and 1993, see William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic
Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War," 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22,
n.5 (1993).
112 People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
Castro was an extraordinary case, in part because the scientists testifying for both
sides decided to hold a meeting, without any lawyers present, to discuss Lifecodes'
DNA evidence. They ended up agreeing that, while DNA had significant promise as a
forensic technique, the particular tests performed in the case were not scientifically
reliable enough to determine whether there was or was not a match. Faced with united
experts, the trial judge held that while DNA forensic identification did meet the Frye
standard of admissibility, the evidence of a match would not be inadmissible in this
instance because "[tihe testing laboratory failed in several major respects to use the
generally accepted scientific techniques and experiments for obtaining reliable results."
Id. at 980, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
113 See, e.g., Eric Lander, DNA Fingerprinting: Science, Law and the Ultimate
Identifier, in THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT 191 (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992); Roger Parloff, How
Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld Tripped Up the DNA Experts, AM. LAW. 50 (1989).
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definitions would render the resulting statistical determination
about random match probability invalid.
114
Second, while Lifecodes' experts said that a blood
sample taken from the defendant's wristwatch matched the
victim's DNA, there appeared to be two extra bands on the
watch sample that did not appear on the victim's autorad.
Lifecodes' experts testified that these extra bands were "most
likely bacterial or plasmid.""5 This raised another important
question about how to define a match: when could extra bands,
or the lack of a band, be explained away as a testing error, the
result of contamination or some other artifact, and when did it
mean that there was no match or that the test was
inconclusive? In combination, these concerns made Lifecodes'
evaluation of matches seem disturbingly subjective.
A third concern about how to interpret a match did not
arise in Castro, but did arise in subsequent cases. Sometimes,
DNA samples in different lanes on the electrophoretic gel may
migrate at different speeds; as a result, two samples from the
same person may not match because one of them has shifted in
a systematic way. Whether and how to recognize and correct
for bandshifting also became an issue."' All three issues
related to how to determine whether two samples significantly
resembling each other actually matched. Autorads were not, as
it turned out, self-interpreting.
2. The Problems of Population Genetics
To determine the meaning of a match, scientists must
be able to provide information about how frequently such a
match occurs. This will depend on how frequently each allele is
found in the population, and how to combine the likelihood of
114 Castro, 144 Misc.2d at 977, 545 N.Y.S. 2d at 998. To see why this issue
matters, imagine that someone testified that both the suspect and the perpetrator had
red hair, and that only one in twenty people had red hair, but that "having red hair"
was defined differently for the purpose of determining, on the one hand, that the
suspect "matched" the perpetrator, and on the other, the likelihood that someone had
red hair.
... Id. at 976, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
"
6 See David H. Kaye, DNA Identification: Some Lingering and Emerging
Evidentiary Issues, 1.4, in Proceedings from the Seventh International Symposium on
Human Identification 12 (1997); Committee on DNA Forensic Science: An Update,
National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (1996).
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each of the alleles into one combined statistic. If loci were
inherited independently, the probabilities could be multiplied
according to the product rule, but if loci were not independent,
using the product rule would result in inaccurate probabilities
that underestimated the frequency with which matches would
occur in the actual population."'
Scientists (and defense attorneys) began to challenge
the laboratories' assumptions about how to make these
calculations. On the first issue, for example, some scientists
argued that there might be concerns about population
substructure. In other words, the frequency of allele
distribution over a large population (for example, Caucasians),
might not reflect the frequency of allele distribution among
some ethnic subpopulations, like Greek-Americans, if in fact,
Greek-Americans choose mates among other Greek-Americans
rather than from the population as a whole. If there were some
reason to believe that the perpetrator was a Greek-American,
the overall population frequencies might not accurately reflect
the frequencies within this sub-population."' (There could be a
similar concern when multiple suspects were genetically
related.) The basic critique was that the statistics presented by
laboratories in court were not based on sufficient study of
actual allele distribution in various ethnic subpopulations;
therefore these statistics might significantly misrepresent the
real-world frequency with which a match would occur. More
generally, attorneys succeeded in persuading courts that valid
and reliable statistical measures of the meaning of a match
were a necessary prerequisite to the admissibility of DNA.
3. Concerns About Error Rates
Although, as we have seen, early proponents of DNA
claimed that it had an error rate of zero, early proficiency tests
suggested otherwise. This led to increased concern about
determining error rates and establishing ongoing proficiency
117 See David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA
Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 485, 524-28 (2d ed. 2000)
These two issues are whether a population is in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and
linkage equilibrium, respectively.
,
18 Id. at 526-27; Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 98, at 126-28.
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tests. It also led to continued attention to the issue of what
jurors should be told. If, for example, a laboratory made false
positive identifications one percent of the time in proficiency
tests, should the jury be told at all about an enormously low
random match probability-say 1 in 500 million-when there
was a one percent chance that this result was reached in error?
Some commentators argue that any numbers with which the
jury is presented should be reduced to account for the chance of
a laboratory error."'
Eventually, sufficient closure was reached about all of
these issues for courts to feel comfortable admitting DNA
profiling evidence once again. But there is no doubt that the
DNA wars forced the new technique's proponents to pay much
greater attention to both their laboratory procedures and the
scientific basis for their statistical claims than they had at the
outset. Moreover, as a result of this experience, courts continue
to scrutinize new DNA techniques with care.
With fingerprinting, by contrast, there was never any
such challenge to the claims of fingerprint examiners. This
leads to an important and interesting question: why the
difference? Why was fingerprinting unchallenged when DNA
provoked the "DNA wars"? Or, to phrase it differently, could we
imagine that DNA might have gone down the same path as
fingerprinting? One could argue that the increasing attention
to the admissibility of expert evidence in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, combined with the enormous significance of the
new technique, meant that DNA profiling inevitably was going
to receive serious and significant scrutiny both inside and
outside the courtroom. It may have been contingent and
serendipitous that biologist Eric Lander agreed to testify for
the defense in Castro, the first case in which the judge
restricted the use of DNA evidence in court. But by this
argument, even if the particular circumstances of the defense
challenges to DNA were not predictable, that such challenges
would have emerged somewhere and somehow was predictable.
Increasingly significant defense challenges would have
eventually forced courts to rethink their fast acceptance of the
19 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA
Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859
(1996).
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technique; this would have been the inevitable consequence of
the adversary process in action.
In my view, such an assumption is far too sanguine. To
be sure, imagining such "what-ifs" necessarily has a fanciful
quality. Still, even if we assume that some defense attorneys
would have eventually mounted robust critiques of, for
example, the population genetics assumptions underlying
DNA, the courts might not have chosen to confront those
challenges directly if they had been delayed just a few years.
With an ever-growing number of precedents holding DNA
admissible, and DNA continually growing in importance as an
investigative tool, judges might have been extremely reluctant
to dislodge it because of concerns about laboratory practices
and population statistics. Some courts might well have relied
on the numerous precedents supporting admissibility, without
grappling with the challenges.12 ° Moreover, even judges who
were uncomfortable eliding the challenges would have had a
plausible doctrinal hook with which to avoid serious discussion
of the issues: they could have argued that these matters,
however important, went to the weight of the evidence rather
than its admissibility.
It is even possible that these defense challenges could
never have emerged. In the history of fingerprinting, we see a
form of evidence that became so rapidly and uniformly
accepted that even the defense bar failed to probe it in
significant ways. Is it so implausible that with DNA there
might have been a short-lived window of opportunity? That is,
if DNA had not been challenged significantly within a
relatively brief period, might it not have become so embedded,
so deeply believed, that it would not have been challenged at
all? At a minimum, it is plausible to tell the story of the
challenges to DNA and the eruption of the DNA wars as having
a degree of cultural contingency.
120 Some courts faced with challenges to handwriting evidence after Daubert,
for example, did exactly this. On handwriting evidence, see generally D. Michael
Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets
Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); D. Michael Risinger,
Handwriting Identification, in DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
(2d ed. forthcoming 2002); Mnookin, supra note 46.
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IV. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO FINGERPRINTING
The final section of this Article is built upon a strange
irony. As it turns out, the challenges to DNA profiling have,
along with some doctrinal changes in our approach to expert
evidence, newly opened the door to admissibility challenges to
the fingerprint, that seemingly most robust form of evidence.
DNA profiling-initially called by its supporters "DNA
fingerprinting" so as to capture metaphorically some of the
extraordinary power of its namesake-could have planted the
seeds for fingerprinting's downfall as legal evidence.
In the last two years, there have been at least sixteen
legal challenges to the reliability of fingerprint evidence.'21 So
far, none of them has been successful. To date, no judge has
ruled that fingerprinting is insufficiently reliable to pass
muster under either Daubert or the relevant state standard. In
fact, those judges that have issued written opinions on the
matter have uniformly supported fingerprinting's validity,
sometimes in strong terms. As one judge wrote: "The court's
decision may strike some as comparable to a breathless
announcement that the sky is blue and the sun rose in the east
yesterday"'22-- that is to say, an exercise in stating the obvious.
The same court went on to express its belief "that latent print
identification is the very archetype of reliable expert
testimony."123 And yet the very existence of these legal
challenges is quite extraordinary, especially given the
entrenched and widespread belief in fingerprinting's authority.
It is therefore worth examining the claims made by those
arguing for the exclusion of fingerprint evidence.
Fingerprinting critics level three main arguments.
First, fingerprint examiners have not established objective and
proven standards for evaluating whether two prints "match."
Second, the error rate for fingerprinting as a technique has
been inadequately studied. Third, there is no statistical
121 The first champion of the fingerprinting challenges was Robert Epstein, a
federal defender in Philadelphia. He brought the first case in 1999: United States v.
Mitchell, No. 96-407 (E.D. Pa. 1999). For a complete list of challenges, see, e.g., a web
site maintained by a latent fingerprint examiner: http://onin.com/fp/daubert_links.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
12 United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 849 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
'Id. at 855.
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foundation for assessing the likelihood that two people might
have prints with any given number of corresponding
characteristics. This lack of statistical foundation is especially
troubling in cases involving distorted and smudged
fingerprints. 24 We will examine each argument in more
detail.1
25
The first claim is that fingerprint examiners in the
United States have not developed uniform standards for
determining what counts as a sufficient basis for an
identification. In some countries, fingerprint examiners require
a certain .number of "points of identification" before declaring a
match; England, for example, requires sixteen such points,
while France requires twelve. While individual fingerprinting
agencies in the United States may have norms about point
standards, there is no minimum number of points required for
courtroom testimony about an identification, and practices
among fingerprint examiners vary.12 Moreover, some leading
examiners reject the point-counting method altogether, arguing
that it oversimplifies the complex information provided by a
fingerprint by focusing exclusively on the location of particular
characteristics. 127 The lack of objective standards means that
determining a match is necessarily subjective; it is based on
the personal judgment of the examiner rather than
intersubjective criteria that remain the same from print to
print and from examiner to examiner. Note the similarity
between this argument and the criticisms of Lifecodes'
practices in Castro, that focused on the inadequacy of declaring
DNA matches simply through subjective visual inspection. 12 8
12' For examples of these arguments, see, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support
of Mr. Choi's Motion to Exclude the Government's Latent Fingerprint Identification
Evidence, United States v. Choi, No. 96 Crim. 118 (E.D. Pa. 1996) [hereinafter Choi
Memorandum].
'2 These arguments are drawn from the briefs in United States v. Choi, and
United States v. Mitchell, both of which were authored by Robert Epstein. There has
been enough interest in these cases that Epstein has conducted seminars for defense
attorneys and has prepared a compact disc with the materials used in these cases.
126 Simon Cole, What Counts for Identity: The Historical Origins of the
Methodology of Latent Fingerprint Identification, 22 Sc. IN CONTEXT 139 (1999).
127 Id.
128 Castro, 144 Misc.2d at 977, 545 N.Y.S. at 998.
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Similarly, critics also argue that fingerprint examiners
in practice violate a significant tenet of the field, the "one
dissimilarity doctrine."129 According to this doctrine, if there is
even one genuine dissimilarity between two prints, the prints
cannot be said to have come from the same finger. The
problem, of course, is in the "fudge" word, "genuine." What
counts as a genuine dissimilarity and how can an examiner
recognize it? In practice, as some examiners acknowledge, an
examiner who is convinced that two prints come from the same
finger will be tempted to explain away any seeming
dissimilarity as an artifact, the result of distortion in the print,
or dirt, or a scar.130 Without clearly articulated standards for
determining when a characteristic can be said to "match,"
separating distortions from genuine differences becomes both
subjective and subject to manipulation. (We see here a
similarity to the arguments about interpreting band-shifting
and the issue of when and how extra bands could be explained
away.) Both of these arguments also go generally to the
"existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation," one of the factors mentioned in Daubert
as an appropriate criterion for evaluating the reliability of
scientific evidence.
131
The second major argument leveled by those
challenging fingerprinting is that the error rate for
fingerprinting has received insufficient attention and study.
Error rate is also one of the factors mentioned explicitly in the
Daubert opinion. 3 2 In the case of fingerprinting, the general
rate of error is simply not known, although there have been a
small number of publicized instances of erroneous
identification. Some proficiency tests, however, indicate that
the error rate may be substantial. In a 1995 proficiency test
conducted by a private company, but designed and assembled
by the International Association of Identification, only forty-
four percent of the 156 fingerprint examiners received a perfect
score.133 Even more disconcerting for a technique that claims to
'2 Choi Memorandum, supra note 124, at 26-27.
'30 Id. at 27 (citing John I. Thornton, The One-Dissimilarity Doctrine in
Fingerprint Identification, 306 INT'L CRIM. POLICE REV. 89 (March 1977)).
"'Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
132 Id.
'3 David Grieve, Possession of Truth, 5 J. FORENSIC IDENT. 521, 523-24 (1996).
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provide certain and absolute proof of identity, thirty-four test
takers, or twenty-two percent, made an erroneous
identification, incorrectly finding a match when none existed.34
The government's response to this argument is, as
argued in the Mitchell case for example, that the error rate for
fingerprint identification is zero, because fingerprints are
unique and permanent and can be accurately distinguished
from one another.' Fingerprint examiners make this same
argument that, although practitioners may on rare occasions
misapply the science of fingerprinting and make errors, the
error rate of the science of fingerprinting is zero. 36 Of course,
what Daubert must mean when it refers to an error rate is the
error rate in practice; to speak of the idealized error rate that
would exist if all examiners were perfect all the time is
irrelevant, indeed practically meaningless. The same argument
could be made of eyewitness testimony, a notoriously
unreliable form of evidence. People are all distinct from one
another in observable ways; therefore the theoretical error rate
of eyewitness identification is zero, though in practice
observers may frequently make errors.
The third criticism of fingerprint evidence is that it has
never been placed on a secure statistical foundation.
Fingerprint examiners have no statistical basis for
determining the probability that a match really indicates that
both prints come from the same human being. This is viewed
as especially problematic when they examine partial, smudged
prints that provide less information from which to draw a
conclusion. How likely is it that two people could have four
points of resemblance, or five or six or eight or ten? Is the
chance of two partial prints from different people matching one
in a hundred, one in a hundred thousand, or one in a billion?
No fingerprint examiner can honestly answer that question,
even though the answer is of course critical to evaluating the
134 Id. at 524. A total of forty-eight erroneous identifications were made by
participants. Subsequent proficiency tests have also revealed significant numbers of
errors. See discussion in Choi Memorandum, supra note 124, at 21-23.
135 Government's Combined Report to the Court and Motions In Limine
Concerning Fingerprint Evidence, United States v. Mitchell, No. 96-407, (E.D. Pa.
1999).
13 For one example of this argument, see http'//www.clpex.com/ArticleslThe-
DetailjTheDetaill.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
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probative value of the evidence of a "match." As the fingerprint
expert who wrote the chapter on fingerprinting in Modern
Scientific Evidence argued, tested probability models "simply
do not exist for fingerprint pattern comparisons."137 And
although there have been a variety of attempts to place
fingerprinting on a secure statistical foundation, experts view
them as flawed and ordinary examiners frequently do not even
know they exist.138 Many :fingerprint experts are even
philosophically opposed -to the development of probabilistic
models, taking it as a principle that fingerprinting should
provide certain and absolute, rather than probabilistic,
identification. 39
Thus, we see that in the last two years, fingerprinting is
facing serious challenge for the first time since it was
introduced into the American courtroom. After a hundred years
of near-universal acceptance, the scientific basis for forensic
fingerprint identification is facing sustained critiques. But why
now? The timing of these challenges is the result of two
phenomenon: first, the Supreme Court's 1993 Daubert opinion
on the admissibility of expert evidence and, more generally, the
increasing focus on judicial gatekeeping of expert evidence; and
second, the controversies over DNA. I am not arguing that
these two developments were strictly necessary for challenges
to fingerprinting to emerge, or that in combination they made
such challenges inevitable. But together, these developments
created a climate in which such legal challenges became more
thinkable: that is to say, a climate in which fingerprinting's
limitations became more visible and obvious, and in which
legal challenge to a well-established, long-accepted form of
scientific proof was doctrinally imaginable.
First, the move toward focusing on reliability and
validity of evidence rather than using a proxy criterion like
"general acceptance" made fingerprinting a more plausible
target. So long as the dominant standard for assessing expert
evidence was the Frye test, which focused on whether a novel
137 David Stoney, Fingerprint Identification, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE,
supra note 120, at § 21-2.3.1.
:38 COLE, supra note 12, at 261. See also id.
3' See generally Cole, supra note 126 (arguing that mainstream fingerprint
examiners take as a basic tenet a belief in certain, rather than probalistic,
identification).
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technique was generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community,140 it would have been extremely difficult to dislodge
a form of evidence that had such deep and longstanding
institutional support. Of course fingerprinting was accepted by
the relevant scientific community, especially if that community
was defined as fingerprint examiners. Even if the community
were defined more broadly-perhaps as forensic scientists in
general-it would have been nearly impossible to argue that
fingerprinting was not generally accepted. After all,
fingerprinting was not just generally accepted; it was
universally accepted, forensic science's gold standard.
Even before Daubert, a number of judges were
beginning to approach the question of the admissibility of
expert evidence as a question of reliability and its assessment,
rather than presuming that general acceptance was the central
issue. 4 ' Daubert solidified this trend by making helpfulness
and validity the touchstones for the evaluation of expert
evidence in federal court, and by making it explicit that judges
were expected to act as gatekeepers and to evaluate the merits
of contested expert evidence.' Daubert provided judges with a
partial checklist of the matters to which they might look in
assessing reliability: whether the theory had been tested or
falsified; whether there was a known error rate; whether there
were accepted standards for the technique's operation; whether
the technique had been peer reviewed; and finally, whether it
was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.'
Though proxies like general acceptance and peer review were
still legitimate criteria for judges to use, Daubert made it clear
that judges were supposed to assess whether the substance of
the expert evidence was adequately reliable.
The Daubert approach offers two significant doctrinal
advantages for anyone attempting to launch a challenge to
fingerprint evidence. First, the views of the relevant
community are no longer dispositive, but are just one factor
among many. There is a good argument that, for a question
"'Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
' See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). The
successful challenges to DNA profiling evidence also evince this tendency.
142 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
141 Id. at 580.
144 Id. at 597.
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like the reliability of fingerprinting, the views of fingerprint
examiners should carry only limited weight. We would hardly
expect polygraph examiners to be the most objective or critical
observers of the polygraph, or those who practice hair
identification to argue that the science was insufficiently
reliable. When there is challenge to the fundamental reliability
of a technique through which the practitioners make their
living, there is good reason to be especially dubious about
"general acceptance" as a proxy for reliability. For a debate
about which of two methods within a field was superior, the
practitioner's views might well be a useful proxy. (Although
even here, one might want to inquire whether, in selecting one
approach over another, the practitioners might have interests
other than accuracy of outcome in selecting one approach over
the other). But when there is an argument that the field itself
is inadequate, the participants' perspective should be a
starting point, not the end of the discussion.
The second advantage of the Daubert approach is that it
offers no safe harbor for techniques with a long history. Frye
itself wrote about "novel" scientific techniques,145 and many
jurisdictions found that it indeed applied only to new forms of
expert knowledge, not to those with a long history of use.
Under Frye, this limitation made sense: if a form of evidence
had been used as legal evidence for a long while, that provided
at least prima facie evidence of general acceptance. Even under
Daubert, judges need not reexamine a form of expertise each
time it is used, for that would be a waste of judicial resources.
However, the key question under Daubert is reliability, and if
there are new arguments that a well-established form of
evidence is unreliable, judges should not dismiss these
arguments with a nod to history.
146
Daubert, then, made it imaginable that courts would
revisit a long-accepted technique that was clearly generally
accepted by the community of practitioners. But it was, I would
suggest, the controversies over DNA profiling that made the
weaknesses in fingerprinting significantly more visible, more
obvious to critics, legal commentators, and defense lawyers
alike. We have already seen the striking resemblance between
4
'Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
146 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584, 590.
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the main arguments made by those challenging fingerprinting,
and the arguments that led to the vituperative clashes over
DNA. The debates over DNA raised issues that had never been
resolved with fingerprinting; indeed, they provided a blueprint
to show what a challenge to fingerprinting would look like. And
the metaphoric link between the two identification techniques
made the parallels only more obvious. Let me be clear: I am not
claiming that the controversies over DNA were a necessary
precondition to challenges to fingerprinting. Even without the
so-called DNA wars, challenges to fingerprinting might have
emerged after Daubert. But DNA brought to light problems
that had been lurking in the shadows around fingerprinting.
They made the problems far easier to see and invited defense
attorneys to recognize that fingerprinting might not fare so
well if subjected to a particular kind of scientific scrutiny.
Of course, fingerprinting has fared all right so far.
Those judges who have considered the issue have continued to
allow fingerprint evidence even in cases involving smudged
and distorted prints. What is most striking about the judicial
response to date is that, for the most part, judges faced with
these challenges do not seriously attempt to confront the
challenges offered by the defense. In United States v.
Mitchell,47 the first judge who held a Daubert hearing on the
issue ruled from the bench and said almost nothing about
whether or how the evidence passed muster under Daubert.
The judge essentially concluded only that the evidence was
"highly probative and substantially outweighs any danger of
unfair prejudice to the defendant."148 The judge in Mitchell did
not even permit the defense experts who were not themselves
fingerprint examiners-historian Simon Cole and forensic
science professor James Starrs-to testify at trial, ruling that
to qualify as an expert, defense experts would have to be latent
fingerprint examiners. 149 When a party is trying to argue that a
profession's fundamental approach and standards are
problematic, it is deeply troubling to hold that only members of
the profession are qualified to testify because trenchant
147 No. 96-407 (E.D. Pa 1999).
148 Transcript at 4, United States v. Mitchell. This is, of course, the test under
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
149 Id.
[Vol. 67: 1
FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE
criticism is far more likely to come from outsiders than from
members of the guild. A magistrate judge who issued an
unpublished ruling also avoided applying Daubert altogether:
the report and recommendation described fingerprinting
techniques, the defense's critiques of the methodology, and the
Daubert standard, but then failed to apply the test to the
technique. 0
In United States v. Havvard,'5' the one published
opinion analyzing fingerprinting under Daubert, the judge did,
at least nominally, apply the Daubert criteria to fingerprinting.
He argued that fingerprinting has indeed been tested by one
hundred years of use "in adversarial proceedings with the
highest possible stakes-liberty and sometimes life."15 2 But this
argument is circular: it says that we know the technique is
reliable because we have long used and trusted it. While long
use may indeed provide an imperfect but not irrelevant form of
testing, it will only do so if we are confident that errors and
testing failures would in fact have been noticed. The judge
argued that standards for controlling the technique of
fingerprinting exist because of "professional training, peer
review, criticism, and presentation of conflicting evidence."'53
But the problem with this argument is that, while it is fair to
say that all of these institutional mechanisms are designed to
create standards for controlling the technique, what is needed
is evidence that they work: that fingerprint examiners actually
use consistent criteria for determining what counts as a match.
The judge also argued that the error rate, though
unknown, must certainly be low; indeed, when fingerprinting
"is subject to fair adversarial testing and challenge" the error
rate must be "vanishingly small."'54 To be sure, some erroneous
identifications might be exposed upon examination by an
opposing expert. But the problems with fingerprinting could be
more structural. That is to say, there might be certain kinds of
error that examiners regularly make, so that multiple
examiners would all find a match when in fact the print came
1"0 United States v. Alteme, No. 99-8131 (S.D. Fla. 2000), available at
http'/onin.com/fp/daubertjlinks.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
151 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
52 Id. at 854.
153 Id.
"54 Id.
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from someone other than the suspect. Moreover, the judge's
argument does not alleviate the defense's most fundamental
challenge: that we simply do not know the statistical
probability that two or more people could each have prints that
match the partial smudged latent print under evaluation.155
Overall, what is most striking about the judicial
response to the challenges to fingerprinting is a general
reluctance to admit that assessing fingerprinting under
Daubert raises tricky issues. It is easy to see why judges are
reluctant to exclude fingerprinting: it is a long-used technique,
an extremely valuable form of evidence to prosecutors, and one
in which the public has enormous faith. What is harder to
understand is why judges are so reluctant to acknowledge that
determining whether fingerprint evidence should survive
scrutiny under Daubert is, at a minimum, a difficult question.
Fingerprinting's claims and assumptions are clearly
surprisingly unproven, and yet the trial court judge in Havvard
ended up concluding that "latent print identification is the very
archetype of reliable expert testimony under [Daubert and
Kumho Tire].""' 6 Although arguing that fingerprinting should
be admissible under the legal standards is a plausible view,
calling it the "archetype of reliable expert testimony"
misunderstands either the defense's critique, the Daubert
standards, or both. Rather, the question the technique raises
is: Just how reliable should a form of evidence have to be to
pass muster under Daubert?
I would suggest that what is driving both the outcomes
and the reasoning of these early opinions is the concern that if
fingerprinting does not survive Daubert scrutiny, neither will a
great deal of other evidence that we currently allow. Rejecting
fingerprinting would, judges fear, tear down the citadel. It
would simply place too many forms of expert evidence in
jeopardy. Even to allow that fingerprinting is a close case
would put at risk too many other forms of evidence that strike
judges as being noticeably less scientific, objective, or
'55 As the first published opinion on fingerprinting, now affirmed on appeal,
Havvard may prove influential. Unfortunately, it was decided on a very thin
evidentiary record: the defense offered no experts, and even failed to introduce into
evidence important documents such as the proficiency tests discussed earlier at notes
134-37 and accompanying text.
ISO Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 855.
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empirically grounded than fingerprinting."7 Judges prefer,
instead, to uphold fingerprinting without careful scrutiny,
perhaps telling themselves that Daubert was not intended to
bring about massive transformations in the range of admissible
evidence. This interpretation is not pure speculation: as the
trial judge in Havvard wrote,
[Tihe error rate for fingerprinting is certainly far lower than the
error rate for other types of opinions that courts routinely allow,
such as opinions about the diagnosis of a disease, the cause of an
accident or disease, whether a fire was accidental or deliberate in
origin, or whether a particular industrial facility was the likely
source of a contaminant in groundwater.58
Moreover, like almost everyone else, judges who are
assessing fingerprinting most likely believe deeply in
fingerprinting. Rightly or wrongly, the technique continues to
have enormous cultural authority. Dislodging such a prior
belief will require, at a minimum, a great deal of evidence,
more than the quantity needed to generate doubt about a
technique in which people have less faith. As these challenges
continue, some judge some place may well decide that
fingerprinting evidence, especially when it is only a partial,
smudged latent print, simply does not pass muster under
Daubert, at least not until fingerprint examiners can offer
some valid statistical basis for declaring the probability that
two prints match. This is, perhaps, the better view, if the
Daubert criteria are taken seriously.
One could therefore criticize these judges for being
ostriches, for burying their heads in the sand instead of
executing their duties under Daubert in a responsible way.
However, their reluctance to apply Daubert strictly to
57 To complicate slightly, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999),
makes clear that judges do have a gatekeeping obligation with respect to all expert
evidence, not simply scientific evidence, but also allows that the mechanism for
assessing reliability might vary from field to field. Moreover, even Daubert presents its
criteria as a partial set of guidelines rather than a checklist.
158 Havuard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854-55. See also the written report of the
magistrate judge in United States v. Alteme, No. 99-88131 (D. Fla. 2000) (noting that
the defense argument "proves too much," in that if it were sufficient to preclude the
fingerprint evidence, "large categories of scientific and technical testimony would be
inadmissible. At a minimum, it would be necessary to eliminate the defense of
insanity, since virtually all psychiatric opinions are subjective, in whole or in part.")
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fingerprinting reflects a deeper and quite problematic issue
that pervades assessments of expert evidence more generally.
Daubert provides one vision of how to assess scientific expert
evidence: basically, with the standards of the scientific method
(at least in an idealized and perhaps somewhat naive version
that may or may not bear any great resemblance to the ways
science is conducted in practice). But surely this idealized
version of the scientific method cannot be the only way to
generate legitimate knowledge. How, then, do we evaluate
other forms of knowledge, tacit knowledge, craft knowledge,
knowledge based on experience, or hybrid knowledge, part
science, part craft, like fingerprinting? When judges refuse to
rule on fingerprinting in careful Daubert terms, they just may
be, knowingly or not, enacting a kind of rebellion against the
notion that a certain vision of science provides the only
legitimate way to provide reliable knowledge, or even the only
way to produce reliable scientific knowledge.
159
'59 Readers may argue that Kumho Tire explicitly acknowledges that other
approaches will be necessary for evaluating non-scientific knowledge. Even the
Daubert decision itself envisions its inquiry as a "flexible" one. The problem with this
argument is, first, that judges cannot easily decide that fingerprinting is something
wholly other than science. Judges have, in practice, self-consciously hedged their bets
on this issue; from the bench decision in Mitchell, the first challenge to fingerprinting,
to the appellate opinion in Havvard, judges elect not to take a position on whether
fingerprinting is scientific. See Transcript, United States v. Mitchell, (Sep. 13, 1999)
(noting "there is no clear line dividing" scientific knowledge and technical or other
specialized knowledge and "therefore, this court does not feel compelled by any case
authority to make that distinction in the case before us"); United States v. Havvard,
2001 WL 804134 at *3 (taking no position on whether fingerprinting is 'scientific,' but
arguing that even if it is not, this is no basis for exclusion). The Havvard appellate
opinion is especially odd in this regard: it argues that "the standards of Daubert... are
not limited in application to 'scientific' testimony alone. Therefore the idea that
fingerprint comparison is not sufficiently 'scientific' cannot be the basis for exclusion
under Daubert." Havvard, 2001 WL 804134 at *3 (citations omitted). The Court's
approach is almost a non-sequiter: while the Daubert gatekeeping obligation is
supposed to apply to all expert evidence, that hardly means that expert evidence
cannot be excluded for being insufficiently scientific, if in fact the proffered evidence is
science. Such a view would vastly limit the scope of Daubert. While it is true that
under Kumho Tire there may be alternative ways to evaluate non-science (for if non-
science were judged only by whether it was science it would invariably necessarily fail),
presumably judges need to understand what kind of expert evidence they are assessing
in order to properly assess it.
The second problem with viewing Kumho Tire as a legitimate escape valve for
judges assessing fingerprinting is that well-accepted methods by which to evaluate the
authority of non-scientific knowledge simply do not yet exist. Some have argued for
"experience" as an alternative criterion, but this argument is quite problematic,
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Whether such a rebellion is to be admired or criticized is
beyond the scope of this Article, which has already ventured
rather far afield from the early history of fingerprinting. But it
does suggest a basic lesson that we can draw from this history:
the legal rule we ask judges to apply to expert evidence will
not, in and of itself, control outcomes. No matter what the
formal legal rule, determinations of admissibility will end up
incorporating broader beliefs about the reliability of the
particular form of evidence, and about the legitimacy of various
ways of knowing.
More generally, this historical look at the origins of
fingerprint evidence starkly suggests that "culture" cannot be
extricated from determinations of expertise and reliability. If a
form of evidence conforms to cultural expectations and
generally-shared conceptions, judges may not scrutinize it
carefully. Determinations of validity are not made in a
vacuum; our ideas of the plausible and our notions of the
persuasive dramatically affect how skeptically we view a new
technique. When faced with a kind of evidence that fits with
our assumptions about the world we all may be Pudd'nheads.
And just as it was far from obvious whether Pudd'nhead was a
fool or a genius until the novel's denouement, it is hard to say
whether the judicial reluctance to rigorously scrutinize
fingerprint evidence under the Daubert criteria reflects a
woeful lack of scientific understanding or, rather, a profound
practical wisdom about the limits of evaluating legal evidence
through a narrowly scientized lens.
because experience does not necessarily produce knowledge (think, for example, of
psychics with decades of experience) and we could frequently have very experienced
scientists offering scientific evidence thought to fail Daubert thus pitting "experience"
against "scientific validity." See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step after
Daubert. Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability
of Non-Scientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2292-94 (1994). See also D.
Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts in a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the
Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508 (2000) (discussing an effort to provide
a taxonomy of expertise). Overall, the fingerprint opinions are not carefully articulated
efforts to provide an alternative basis for determining reliability. The judges' approach
to fingerprinting reliability comes closer to Justice Stewart's view of obscenity: they
know it when they see it. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
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The second lesson from this history is that there may be
a productive aspect to battles between expert witnesses. A
constant leitmotif in the history of expert evidence has been
the call for the use of neutral experts. Many see neutral
experts as a panacea, both to prevent the jury from having to
decide between different views on matters about which it lacks
knowledge, and to ensure that valid science comes before the
tribunal. Learned Hand, for example, called explicitly for
unanimity of expert opinion. In a 1901 article supporting the
use of court-appointed neutral experts, Hand wrote: "[The jury]
will do no better with the so-called testimony of experts than
without, except where it is unanimous. If the jury must decide
between such they are as badly off as if they had none to
help."16 He was far from the first to call for this solution. In the
century since, neutral experts have been so frequently
recommended as a cure for the problems of expert evidence
that the only wonder is that we have in practice budged so
little from our adversarial approach to expert testimony. Early
fingerprint experts were not neutral experts, in the sense that
they were called by a party rather than appointed by the court,
but they do provide one of our only examples of a category of
expert scientific knowledge from which the typical adversarial
battles were largely absent.
From one perspective, fingerprinting is indeed a success
story in that it has been viewed as an especially authoritative
form of evidence for nearly a hundred years. So perhaps one
lesson we can draw is that unanimity of expert evidence does
indeed produce cultural authority. But the history of
fingerprint evidence also shows us that while it is easy to
disparage "battles of the experts" as expensive, misleading, and
confusing to the factfinder, these battles may also reveal
genuine weaknesses in proffered expert knowledge. It is,
perhaps, precisely because of the lack of these challenges that
fingerprinting was long viewed as a paragon of certainty, as
the most secure and incontestable form of knowledge.
Ironically, had defense experts in fingerprinting emerged from
the beginning, fingerprint evidence might have lower cultural
status but be even more trustworthy than it is today.
1G0 Hand, supra note 74, at 56.
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